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              Abstract                   
    During the Vietnam War, the United States attempted to defeat the North Vietnamese 
through assorted endeavors. One such effort developed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
in 1967, was referred to as the Phoenix Program. This covert operation combined existing 
counterinsurgency programs in a concerted effort to ‘neutralize’ the Vietcong infrastructure 
(VCI). Even though the program terminated at the war’s end, Phoenix rose from the ashes to 
assist the United States across the globe. This research will explore Phoenix, its objectives, 
methods, and impacts, along with its application to contemporary practices utilized by the US 
government against various adversaries. This analysis involves an examination of both primary 
and secondary sources related to Phoenix. Government documents from US military and CIA 
archives, along with congressional hearings, explain the operation, its goals, and effects. Recent 
secondary sources disclose aspects of the program utilized as a mainstay of America’s military 
and intelligence agency efforts to fight terrorism.                    
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                                          Abbreviations                            
ARVN — Army of the Republic of Vietnam          
CG — Census Grievance-CIA covert action program designed to obtain information on the VCI 
through static agents in villages, or mobile agents in armed propaganda teams.         
CIA—Central Intelligence Agency         
CORDS--Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support     
COSVN—Central Office for South Vietnam                   
DIOCC — District Intelligence and Operations Coordination Center: office of the Phoenix 
adviser in each of South Vietnam’s 250 districts.        
GVN — Government of the Republic of Vietnam         
ICEX — Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation: original name of the Phoenix program, 
formed in June 1967.            
ICRC—International Committee of the Red Cross                     
JMWAVE—CIA intelligence gathering station in Miami, training facility for anti-Cuban 
operations, existing on what is now the site of the Miami Zoo.      
KUBARK—counterintelligence manual and codename for CIA                     
MACV — Military Assistance Command, Vietnam: arrived in Saigon in February 1962 as a 
unified command under the Commander in Chief, Pacific, managing the US military effort in 
South Vietnam.            
MAAG—US Military Assistance Advisory Group                     
MKULTRA—principal CIA program involving the research and development of chemical, 




human behavior.            
MPAJA—Malayan Peoples’ Anti-Japanese Army                     
NLF — National Liberation Front: formed in 1960 by the various insurgent groups in South 
Vietnam.                              
NPIASS-II—National Police Infrastructure Analysis Subsystem                   
NVA — North Vietnamese Army           
OSS—Office of Strategic Services-forerunner of the CIA                   
PAVN—People’s Army of Vietnam                      
Phung Hoang — The mythological Vietnamese bird of conjugal love that appears in times of 
peace, pictured holding a flute and representing virtue, grace, and harmony. Also, the name 
given to the South Vietnamese version of Phoenix.                   
PIC—Province Interrogation Centers          
PRP—People’s Revolutionary Party                     
PRU — Provincial Reconnaissance Units: mercenary forces under the control of the CIA in 
South Vietnam.                      
PSC — Province Security Committee-nonjudicial body charged with the disposition of captured 
VCI.                              
SACSA — Special assistant (to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) for Counterinsurgency 
and Special Activities: office within the Joints Chiefs with responsibility for Phoenix policy.  
SEATO—Southeast Asia Treaty Organization         
SERE—Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape-training for US military personnel   
USAID—United States Agency for International Development                                                    




VCI — Viet Cong Infrastructure: all Communist party members and NLF officers, plus Vietcong 
and NVA saboteurs and terrorists.           
VNQDD — Vietnam Quoc Dan Dang: Vietnamese branch of the Kuomintang.                      
Portions of this list come from Douglas Valentine, The Phoenix Program, (New York: William 




                                                        Introduction          
             
   Overview of Phoenix and US Involvement in Vietnam 
 
 
 Fear is the foundation of most governments.       
 -John Adams 
            
 The unit of American soldiers approached the hamlet in broad daylight with a list of 
suspected Vietcong leaders. After locating one of the townspeople, the group attempted to find 
out where a suspect resided. If the person failed to provide a location, a sandbag with eyeholes 
would be placed over their head and they would be led through the village on a [commo] wire 
leash. Then the individual would be asked, “to shake his head when the unit passed the target’s 
house.”1 After nightfall, operatives would knock on the door of the accused’s home and 
“whoever answered the door would be blasted with gunfire.”2 Such was a tactic employed by 
members of the Phoenix program, a counterinsurgency operation administrated by the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), which attempted to neutralize the Vietcong infrastructure (VCI), “the 
political and administrative organization through which the Viet Cong controlled the villages and 
hamlets of South Vietnam,” during the Vietnam War.3 Phoenix reflects a legacy of torture, still 
considered by the CIA and the US military as a necessary and viable tool in campaigns against 
various adversaries, even though evidence of its effectiveness in Vietnam is mixed.   
 The following questions will be examined in relation to this clandestine undertaking. 
How and why was the Phoenix program developed and what purposes did it serve? How was the 
operation implemented and who was involved? What was the reaction of the South Vietnamese 
army to Phoenix? Were they receptive to the operation since the CIA and the US military ran it? 
What was the overall impact of the program on the war in Vietnam and did it succeed in 




blueprint for later endeavors by the US government in various conflicts including El Salvador, 
Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq?          
 Many historians have written about Phoenix, since the 1970s. Scholars such as Stanley 
Karnow, Gabriel Kolko, and Robert Asprey provide insight into the operation’s effectiveness 
based on interviews with Viet Cong, North and South Vietnamese officials, and Phoenix officers 
and operatives. Douglas Valentine explores the program’s legal and moralistic aspects, while 
Dale Andrade looks at the veracity of the historical narrative concerning the operation and 
concludes that much of the criticism leveled at the CIA’s innovation is false. Tal Tovy, a military 
historian, examined sources that discuss the operation and surmises that it reflects a shifting 
image concerning US engagements in Vietnam. More recently, Andrew Finlayson, another 
military historian, scrutinizes the logistics of Phoenix and its usefulness as a counterinsurgency 
effort.4 My research builds upon the existing literature by offering recently declassified 
information on the topic and contends that even though the operation’s results were questionable 
depending upon whom you consult, the United States fully sanctioned and implemented Phoenix 
interrogation techniques.          
 As with any operation implemented by intelligence agencies or military organizations, at 
its founding a name was required. In this case, the program derived its name from a mythical 
bird. The Greek historian Herodotus first commented about the fowl over 2500 years ago in The 
History of Herodotus. He notes that he had never actually seen the creature but that it only 
appeared, “according to the accounts (of the people of Heliopolis) once in five hundred years, 
when the old phoenix dies.”5 The bird’s offspring would then rise from the ashes, and transport 
priests to the temple altar located in Heliopolis. In Asian cultures, the phoenix is held in high 




in Vietnamese mythology” that “represented grace, virtue, peace, and concord.”6 To the 
originators of the operation, “Phoenix was the best English approximation of the Vietnamese 
mythical bird.”7            
 Before undertaking an examination of Phoenix, a brief background explaining the history 
of US involvement in Vietnam provides assistance in understanding why the United States, its 
military services, and intelligence agencies instituted and utilized the operation. In 1857, the 
French emperor Napoleon decided to invade Vietnam. This action was a result of France’s 
efforts to advance capitalism “which generated the need for overseas markets and the desire for a 
larger French share of the Asian territories conquered by the West.”8 The Vietnamese were 
unable to repel military forces and signed a “treaty in June 1862, which ceded the conquered 
territories to France.”9 France continued to mount efforts to control Vietnam and three adjoining 
provinces, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand, and in 1897 “moved to impose a Western-style 
administration on their colonial territories and to open them to economic exploitation”10 These 
capitalistic endeavors generated adverse effects on the Vietnamese people. Resistance to French 
rule revolved around this foreign economic intrusion, accompanied by “the lack of any 
Vietnamese participation in government.”11 A movement for national liberation was also 
pursued. After World War I, this drive continued to gain momentum and “led to a revival of 
clandestine and revolutionary groups.”12 Finally, the Vietnamese Communist Party, led by its 
founder Ho Chi Minh, was able to seize Hanoi and as 1946 began, “there were two Vietnams: a 
communist north and a noncommunist south.”13        
 In 1946, Ho Chi Minh sent a letter to US President Harry Truman asking for his help “in 
gaining independence for Vietnam.”14 That same year, efforts by Ho Chi Minh to gain 




the French in Hanoi. This action resulted in “the First Indochina War, also called the Franco-
Vietnamese War.”15 In 1948, Truman decided to assist the French in conducting their “war effort 
in Vietnam.”16 Two years later, both China and the Soviet Union acknowledged their recognition 
of “Ho Chi Minh's government, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.”17 The very same year, the 
United States provided financial support to France. The total of aid given amounted to “20 
million” dollars.18 Also in 1950,  a policy memorandum entitled United States Objectives and 
Programs for National Security (NSC-68), issued by the United States National Security Council, 
committed the United States “to assist nations threatened by Soviet aggression.”19 This was 
followed by an initial group of US military advisors—the US Military Assistance Advisory 
Group (MAAG), which arrived in Saigon in September.      
 In 1954, President Dwight D. Eisenhower proclaimed the essence of a domino theory and 
its application to communist infiltration when he stated, “You have a row of dominoes set up” 
and “you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is a certainty that it will 
go over very quickly.”20  Eisenhower’s concern was that once a country like Vietnam fell into 
communist ranks, other countries in Indochina would also fall. In the same year, the National 
Security Council suggested to the US that it should “maintain a friendly non-communist South 
Viet Nam and prevent a communist victory through all Viet Nam elections.”21 The Southeast 
Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was also created in 1954 to furnish “a collective security 
framework” which would enable the United States “to bolster pro-Western factions inside South 
Vietnam.”22 South Vietnamese leader “Ngo Dinh Diem provided the instrument for 
implementing American policy.”23 In 1955, under American guidance, Diem consolidated power 
in Saigon and rejected principles advocated in the Geneva Accords, while Ho Chi Minh, 




torture, and execution of “thousands of people classified as landowners and wealthy farmers.” 
This action prompted a “mass exodus” in which many Vietnamese families fled and headed to 
South Vietnam.”24          
 In 1959, two US military advisors were killed in Vietnam, and became “the first 
American deaths (non-combat) reported in Vietnam.”25 The very next year, the US decided to 
place more advisors in the country, increasing the number from 327 to 685.26 That same year, 
President Diem repelled “an attempted coup by his own South Vietnamese government forces.”27  
Further opposition against Diem also developed in 1960 with the formation of the National Front 
for the Liberation of South Vietnam, also referred to as the National Liberation Front (NLF). 
This group along with “its military wing—the Viet Cong (VC),” received funding from North 
Vietnam and was composed of “ex-Viet Minh guerilla soldiers from the South.”28 While these 
events transpired, President John F. Kennedy decided to advance his predecessor’s agenda 
calling for a “move forward to meet communism.”29 The year 1961 marked not only the first 
American combat deaths in Vietnam, but also the killings of “4,000 South Vietnamese officials” 
by the Viet Cong.30 By 1962, the United States had increased its military forces in Vietnam to 
11,000.31 Another event that took place that year was the institution of the Strategic Hamlet 
Program. This US initiative attempted “to group the peasant population into fortified villages” in 
an attempt “to isolate the rural population from Viet Cong influence and, by providing education 
and health care, assist Diem with his rule.”32 However, this effort failed because of resentment 
by peasants who were “uprooted from their homes.”33     
 Key events related to additional US involvement in Vietnam occurred in 1963 when the 
United States participated in “the overthrow of the Diem government.”34 On November 1, a 




headquarters,” placed Diem under arrest, “and he and his brother were murdered.”35 This 
assassination generated a much “deeper US involvement in Viet Nam affairs” resulting in the 
accumulation of “15,000 American troops.”36 Following JFK’s murder a few weeks later on 
November 22, 1963, new President Lyndon Johnson escalated the war in Vietnam even further. 
When he came into power, “there were 16,000 American troops in Vietnam. When he left there 
were more than 500,000.”37          
 In August of 1964, an ‘alleged’ second attack by North Vietnamese torpedo boats on the 
USS Maddox, an American destroyer stationed in the Gulf of Tonkin, became the impetus for 
mass escalation of the war and immediately led to the passage of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution 
which prompted “massive American bombings of North Vietnam and commitment of large 
numbers of American ground troops to offensive and aggressive combat.”38 By 1967, and the 
beginnings of Phoenix, many Vietnamese opposed United States involvement in the affairs of 
their nation. In protest, they carried signs that declared, “End foreign dominance of our country,” 
and began orchestrating attacks on “American facilities.”39 




                                                                      Chapter 1               
                                                                                            
                                Analysis of the Historical Phoenix Narrative    
  
               The only people who see the whole picture are the ones who step outside the frame.       
  -Salman Rushdie              
   
 To promote a better understanding of Phoenix, a detailed examination and analysis of 
specific literature on the subject using both primary and secondary sources is required. Dr. Tal 
Tovy, a military historian looked at sources that discuss the operation and put together a 
compilation of the information in an article entitled “The Rebirth of the Phoenix: The 
Historiography about the Phoenix Program and the Changes in the Attitudes of American 
Society toward the Vietnam War.” This historiography is beneficial because it presents several 
historians’ claims accompanied by evidentiary support, which allows investigatory comparisons 
to help discover the ‘truth’ about Phoenix. The article was published in Historia: Journal of the 
Historical Society of Israel in 2004.              
 The underlying directive in Tovy’s work is to scrutinize the historiographic change that 
took place in research related to the Vietnam War through an examination of the Phoenix 
program. This historiographic discussion revolves around the definition of the concept of 
neutralization against the Viet Cong infrastructure, the primary goal of Phoenix. The author asks 
some very intriguing questions, such as, “what is the neutral?”1 Was the intent of the operation, 
“to liquidate, or to lead to the desertion of the activists or to try to capture them in life?”2 Did 
neutralization translate into the murder of innocent civilians, as some accounts relate? Did some 
reports avoid use of the term murder, because of perceptions that the interrogators had of those 
that they were interviewing? These questions establish a basis for investigation related to trends 




 The author examines the literature concerning Phoenix and presents information from 
various sources related to the operation. He refers to Stanley Karnow’s work, Vietnam: A 
History, which contains interviews with Viet Cong and North Vietnamese officials. These 
discussions regarding Phoenix revealed “a deep fear among the Viet Cong and was seen as a 
very dangerous plan for the Communist war effort in South Vietnam.”3 Historian Gabriel Kolko 
noted that the “program was far more effective than expected” by “its planners, and its 
operators.”4 Tovy speculates and concludes that since both of these researchers “do not emerge 
from a point of view,” that can be labeled pro-American, “it can be determined with great 
certainty that the Phoenix program was effective.”5 Mention is also made of Robert Asprey, a 
military historian, who reported in his book, War in the Shadows - The Guerrilla in History, 
“that the Phoenix program was very effective.”6       
 Tovy’s historiography is not the only aspect of the article that is useful in the exploration 
of Phoenix. The work also provides a timetable, which demonstrates how accounts of the 
operation have changed in relation to attitudes towards the Vietnam War. The author does not 
endeavor to judge or praise what took place between operatives and suspected VCI. He merely 
sheds light on the narrative concerning Phoenix by presenting the views of several historians 
who not only defend it, but also criticize it as well. Tovy also notes that during the nineties 
research revealed that corruption within the operation was attributed to the South Vietnamese, 
and that “the United States had no oversight on events.”7 He concludes his study by noting that 
morality issues surrounding Phoenix “will continue to stand in the middle of an intense 
discussion that cannot be determined,” and that “any discussion of the Phoenix program’s future 
also depends on American society in relation to the Vietnam War.”8    




question, “Was Phoenix a legal, moral, and popular program that engendered abuses or was it an 
instrument of unspeakable evil—a manifestation of everything wicked and cruel?”9 With 
government documents and personal account interviews, the author demonstrates that the 
operation was not only insidiously immoral but also grossly ineffective in accomplishing its goal 
to destroy the National Liberation Front (NLF) and VCI. Firsthand accounts used as evidence to 
support Valentine’s claims come from interviews conducted with individuals that participated in 
the program as well as those who witnessed atrocities committed by CIA operatives and their 
assistants.            
 In researching Phoenix, Valentine wrote a letter to William Colby, requesting 
information from him about the program. He explained to the former DCI that he was attempting 
to ‘de-mystify’ the operation. Colby was in favor of such an approach along with Valentine’s 
objective to consider “different points of view.”10 As a result, with Colby’s support, the author 
was introduced to several CIA senior advisers.11 This set the stage for discovering information 
on Phoenix from inside the Agency. Valentine made use of his interview skills “to persuade a lot 
of these CIA people to talk about Phoenix.”12              
 Valentine also approached his research based on an organizational perspective. He 
considers this to be instrumental in any investigation of a bureaucracy like the CIA.13 In a radio 
interview conducted in 2018, Valentine argues that in attempting to understand the operations of 
an intelligence agency, one must realize that “they have an historical arc” with a beginning, a 
purpose, operational guidelines and “management structures.”14 With this idea at the forefront, 
he communicated with one of Phoenix’s original organizers, Nelson Brickman, a Yale graduate, 
and “an organizational genius.”15 This set the stage for a better understanding of how the CIA 




 Another influential Phoenix operative interviewed by Valentine, who will be discussed 
later in this thesis was Evan Parker. With his cooperation, Valentine was able to compile “a 
roster of everybody in the Phoenix Directorate from when Parker started it in the summer of 
1967.”16 Since William Colby introduced Valentine to Parker and other Phoenix advisers, they 
cooperated with him which contributed invaluably to the writing of his book. As Parker put it, 
“(Colby) was the Director and we still consider him to be the Director. If he says you’re okay, 
we believe it.”17 Also, due to the approach he took in conducting interviews, such as not asking 
former operatives if they killed anyone or had done anything illegal and stressing that he was 
only interested in the facts concerning the program, Valentine was able to obtain ‘their secrets.’ 
 At the outset of the book, the writer wisely maintains that he was limited in his pursuit of 
the ‘truth’ concerning Phoenix, due to several factors which acted as limitations on his research. 
These include program participants who “signed nondisclosure statements” prohibiting them 
from revealing what they knew; those “silenced by their own conscience,” and “soldiers whose 
careers would suffer if they were to reveal the secrets of their employers.”18 Valentine also notes 
that there was a cover-up of the operation which included “falsification of records” and 
concealment of CIA “misdeeds under a cloak of secrecy, threats, and fraud.”19 Valentine 
concludes his book by noting that even though Phoenix officially ended in Vietnam, its legacy 
and distorted principles live on “in the imaginations of ideologues obsessed with security, who 
seek to impose their way of thinking on everyone else.”20     
 Dale Andrade’s book, Ashes to Ashes: The Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War, 
published in 1990, also provides information on the operation. He begins his work by pointing 
out that the authenticity of the historical narrative concerning the Phoenix program depends upon 




functions and its accomplishments or contrasting deficiencies. He notes that there is a “bit of 
truth in every interpretation” regarding Phoenix.21 However, he maintains that much of the 
criticism leveled at the CIA’s innovation is false, since “polemics seem to have clouded the 
reality of Phoenix to a greater degree than any other aspect of the Vietnam War.”22 According to 
Andrade, the public’s view of the operation has been “mired in myth and misunderstanding” 
based on many years of “allegations, half-truths, and outright lies.”23 Thus, his book not only 
attempts to set the record straight but also strives to provide justification for US policy.   
 Ashes to Ashes provides a history of Phoenix, which led up to its inception, and how it 
was used to fight the Viet Cong infrastructure (VCI). After the murder of Ngo Dinh Diem, 
President of South Vietnam in November 1963, paramilitary groups known as “Provincial 
Reconnaissance Units (PRUs), developed in early 1964 to strike at the guerillas in the 
villages.”24 American advisers, numbering around 600, including “mostly military but some 
State Department and 20 to 40 CIA specialists,” worked alongside the PRUs (fig. 1.3) to 
interrogate civilians, while the CIA recruited individuals to assist with counter terrorism 
techniques to decimate the VCI and the NLF, who worked to overthrow the South Vietnamese 
government and unify North and South Vietnam.25 At first, the CIA’s efforts were viewed as 
merely an extension of imperialist tactics that had been employed during the Diem regime. 
However, with the rise of Phoenix in 1967, the objective became “a secret war against a secret 
enemy.”26 Andrade argues that even though the CIA did accumulate vast amounts of intelligence 
concerning the opposition, Phoenix ultimately failed due to poor nationwide implementation.27 
 A few criticisms of the book can be made. First, there is excessive reliance on US 
government documents. This clouds the author’s discussion of efforts by Diem’s regime leading 




Andrade criticizes Diem’s efforts but does not provide Vietnamese documents to support those 
claims. Second, the author maintains that Phoenix was not an assassination program, as many of 
its critics contend, because more VCI were captured than killed. This begs the question. But 
weren’t thousands still murdered? He also argues that differences in the use of the word 
assassination are arbitrary. If the identity of the person killed was unknown, it was war, if known 
it was assassination. Third, contradictory conclusions on the effectiveness of Phoenix are 
presented. As mentioned earlier, the program’s implementation failure is mentioned (p. 282). 
Then a few pages later, the author claims “Americans made the Phoenix program work.”28 
 Another military historian, Andrew A. Finlayson, considers Phoenix as a case study in an 
article entitled, “A Retrospective on Counterinsurgency Operations: The Tay Ninh Provincial 
Unit and its Role in the Phoenix Program, 1969-1970,” published in Studies in Intelligence in 
2007.  The central theme of this piece consists of a narrative that describes the role of a South 
Vietnamese province, Tay Ninh, in relation to this counterinsurgency operation.    
 Finlayson describes Phoenix as “one of several pacification and rural security programs 
that CIA ran in South Vietnam during the 1960s.”29 Pacification was an attempt to persuade the 
peasantry that both their own government and the United States “were sincerely interested in 
protecting them from the Viet Cong.”30 The idea was that if the South Vietnamese were trained 
in defensive tactics, “large areas of the South Vietnamese countryside could be secured or won 
back from the enemy without direct engagement by the US military.”31 By utilizing lists of 
known Viet Cong operatives, CIA agents and South Vietnamese police would interrogate “these 
individuals for further intelligence on the communist structure and its operations.”32 If people 
resisted being questioned they were killed. The author argues against the idea that Phoenix was 




(PRU’s), like the one at Tay Ninh, were only responsible for killing 14 percent of VCI 
interrogated under the program.33         
 Criticism can be leveled against the author’s presentation of information related to the 
effectiveness of Phoenix. He contends that by the time of the 1968 Tet offensive, the operation 
“had removed over 5,000 VCI from action, and that conventional military actions and desertions-
-some prompted by Phoenix--accounted for over 20,000 more.”34 As a result, US military efforts 
in combination with Phoenix “had eliminated upwards of 80,000 VCI through defection, 
detention, or death.”35 However, criticism of these claims is contained in three arguments. First, 
the statistics mentioned are from Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support 
(CORDS), a consolidation of military and civilian pacification efforts organized by the US 
Military Assistance Command (MACV). It is doubtful that the data is accurate since it is based 
on reports that are probably exaggerated, considering the source. Even the author notes that the 
figures lie “on the high end of estimates, all of which were dependent on statistics of varying 
reliability.”36 Second, the 80,000 VCI elimination figure does not isolate a number unique to 
Phoenix, and neither does the claim of ‘some’ desertions that occurred. Thus, these claims fail to 
provide any clarity of impact on the effectiveness of the operation. Third, even though the author 
mentions CORDS as his source, he fails to provide primary source documentation and instead 
refers to secondary sources to confirm his claim.       
 An article published in World Politics in 2007, by Stathis N. Kalyvas and Matthew Adam 
Kocher entitled, “How ‘Free’ is Free Riding in Civil Wars? Violence, Insurgency, and the 
Collective Action Problem,” presents important information on Phoenix. Kalyvas and Kocher 
explore difficulties faced by counterinsurgency efforts and the correlation of these violent 




Infrastructure Analysis Subsystem (NPIASS-II), described by the authors as, “a joint 
intelligence-gathering and coordination system designed to identify and ‘neutralize’ clandestine 
agents of the Vietcong in South Vietnam,” is examined using a mathematical model to assess 
“rebel and noncombatant relative risk.”37 Specifically, the analysis attempts to demonstrate that 
“the individual risk of nonparticipation approaches that of participation, thus eliminating the 
collective action problem faced by rebel organizers.”38 The authors point out that Phoenix offers 
a detailed data set but is limited by its coverage of a specific “group of people rather than the 
population at large.”39         
 Kalyvas and Kocher’s analysis of the Phoenix database is revelatory in several ways. To 
begin, their observations indicate “that a simple cross-tabulation of confirmation and status” 
undertaken by Phoenix agents provides a narrative of “capricious violence.”40 The data 
demonstrates “that only about 10 percent of all individuals targeted under the Phoenix Program 
were confirmed VC by the database’s own standards.”41 Of those that were eventually killed, 
“4.5 percent were confirmed VC.”42 This can be contrasted with the termination by operatives 
accounting for “20 percent unconfirmed” Viet Cong.43 The record also shows that 34 percent 
were captured and 18 percent became defectors.44 When the data collection ended in 1973, “25 
percent of the unconfirmed VC remained at large,” while “94 percent of the confirmed VC also 
remained at large.”45           
 In layman’s terms, this means that for every 100 suspected VC infiltrators, 94 of them 
avoided Phoenix operators. Those considered not as likely to be in collusion with the enemy by 
the designated standards “were twenty-four times more likely to be killed than highly suspicious 
ones.”46 These minor suspects had a five times greater chance of facing termination than their 




thirteen times greater odds of being killed and twenty-six times greater odds of being captured or 
killed.”48 Kalyvas and Kocher conclude that a simple and very plausible reason that explains this 
“data is that the confirmation process was reasonably successful at distinguishing real Vietcong 
agents from innocents.”49         
 Further study of the Phoenix database, the National Police Infrastructure Analysis 
Subsystem (NPIASS-II), which contains “a summary of all the information held on each 
individual, including a record of each person’s status as of the close of the program: captured, 
killed, defected, or at large,” reveals several key findings.50 First, the information that Phoenix 
accumulated came from “numerous military and police organizations operating as part of the 
U.S. alliance,” and was utilized “to target individuals for capture or assassination.”51                                      
Second, the authors indicate that their findings corroborate current literature that maintains, 
“Phoenix was wildly inaccurate, killing or otherwise victimizing numerous civilians for every 
legitimate Vietcong member.”52 Third, even though the operation only represented a small part 
of the overall violence that took place during the Vietnam War, a realistic claim can be made that 
it was “the best attempt of the U.S. and South Vietnamese governments to target the Vietcong 
selectively and to avoid civilian casualties.”53      
 There are a few noteworthy criticisms in regards to the data and the authors’ analysis. 
First, it appears that the claim made regarding Phoenix’s success may not be legitimate 
considering that: (1) existing literature shows operational inaccuracies which resulted in the 
deaths of many civilians; and (2) targeted individuals were part of a “perverse selection 
mechanism,” which meant that “those most likely to be innocent were precisely the most likely 
to be victimized.”54 Second, the impact of Phoenix on those targeted, “the most important 




Defense Department analyst’s observation cited in the article. Thomas C. Thayer contends, 
“Phoenix was good at locating rank-and-file Vietcong agents but poor at getting high-ranking 
agents.”55 Compounding this issue, personal vendettas played a significant role in targeting, 
which could explain why some victims of Phoenix were not even part of the Vietcong 
infrastructure.  One account indicates that some “were personal enemies, men who had insulted 
their sisters, men who had stolen their sweethearts,” farmers who had failed to repay borrowed 
money “from their families,” along with “GVN [South Vietnam Government] officials who had 
beaten their cousins,” and even “family members of these enemies.”56 These relatives were also 





Phoenix Comes to Life in Vietnam  
              Phoenix was an essential part of the war effort, designed to protect the Vietnamese people from 
 terrorism.            
 -William Colby           
  
 Key operational concepts central to Phung Hoang and Phoenix originated with a Buddhist 
from Central Vietnam, Tran Ngoc Chau, an officer in the South Vietnamese Army, who had 
been a communist with the Viet Minh fighting against the French at the end of World War 2.1 
After enduring disenchantment with communism, because of “the Viet Minh’s growing emphasis 
on class struggle,” he, “joined the French and was later trained by the Americans.”2 Chau was 
convinced that “the political organization of the communists was more important than the low-
level guerrillas,” and that the civil war in his country was a conflict, which involved “improving 
the lives of the country's poor and winning their allegiance—not about using guns and bombs, 
which did nothing but create more Viet Cong.”3 He realized, however, that there would be some 
Viet Cong who “would never give up and would have to be eliminated.”4   
 With the backing of President Ngo Dinh Diem, Chau began work with counter 
insurgency efforts against the Viet Cong. In 1962, he was assigned as chief of the large Kien Hoa 
province located in the Mekong Delta, spending three years there, “experimenting with 
alternative counterinsurgency methods.”5 While in Kien Hoa, Chau came to the realization “that 
the government faced several overlapping problems,” including its “intelligence system” which 
he referred to as “almost a joke,” since it was dependent “on informants who had served the state 
for years and who were often fed disinformation by the enemy.”6 This promoted a lack of 
knowledge in the province since it was not known “who the insurgents were or where they were 




their whereabouts superior officers “resorted to firepower-intensive operations that killed or 
wounded local residents.”8 Angry villagers became even further upset with “local officials and 
police officers, many of whom were incompetent, corrupt or both.”9   
 As a solution to these problems, Chau came up with the Census-Grievance program, 
which sent “teams of cadres to villages and hamlets under government control.”10 Upon arrival, 
the units would take a census of the inhabitants and then begin interviewing each adult 
townsperson. Questions asked attempted to find out if the villagers felt “abusive local officials, 
whom Mr. Chau could then discipline or remove,” were taking advantage of them.11 The primary 
objective of these interviews “was to collect more and better information about the enemy.”12 
Counterinsurgency expert David Galula explains the importance of the census, “A census, if 
properly made and exploited, is a basic source of intelligence, explains the importance of the 
census. It would show, for instance, who is related to whom, an important piece of information in 
counterinsurgency warfare because insurgent recruiting at the village level is generally based 
initially on family ties.”13         
 The other important and crucial contribution Chau advanced was counter terror teams, 
the genesis of Phung Hoang. Gaining assistance from the CIA, these squads comprised “small 
numbers of men trained to conduct clandestine missions in enemy-controlled territory.”14 Chau 
would obtain intelligence that indicated who the enemy was and his location then dispatch 
“three-man counterterrorism teams, “which would identify the hardcore leaders and kill them if 
necessary.”15 Thus, Chau and his CIA accomplices attempted to disrupt and eliminate the VCI.  
 Chau did know, however, that there were possibilities for abuse of his innovations. For 
example, a competitive and unethical business proprietor could “manipulate the Census-




Communist.”16 He also knew that his teams, without proper training and adequate supervision, 
might take to heart that they had a license to kill, and “commit murder.”17 To cope with this issue 
Chau utilized “inspectors to investigate reports of official wrongdoing.”18 He also condemned 
the practice of “deadly force” and suggested it should only be used as “a last resort, taken only 
after efforts to persuade enemy operatives to defect to the government had failed.”19  
 With Chau’s counterterrorism program in place, Phoenix began its rise in May 1967, 
when President Lyndon Johnson created “a new organization called Civil Operations and 
Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS).”20 This military body was a part of the US 
pacification effort to win South Vietnamese ‘hearts and minds’ and placed all personnel and 
programs with the exception of the CIA, “under a single adviser at the provincial or district 
level.”21 Robert Komer, who had joined the CIA in 1947, served as a deputy to General William 
Westmoreland, commander of the US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) from 
1964 to 1968, and later served as Johnson’s National Security Adviser, headed CORDS. 
Visualizing problems “in the counterinsurgency effort, Komer and senior CIA officers created 
the Phoenix program,” to focus “on the leadership of the Viet Cong shadow government,” which 
had infiltrated South Vietnamese villages.22 The reasoning used to justify the operation was that 
once Viet Cong leaders were eliminated, their “followers would become disorganized or collapse 
outright.”23 By creating coordination centers that would facilitate the sharing of South 
Vietnamese and American information about the shadow governments, single-source data could 
be corroborated which would diminish any “duplication of effort,” and connect “intelligence 
organizations to operational forces.”24 Later, after ending his work at the Pentagon, Komer 
reflected on US efforts in Vietnam by commenting, “I would have done a lot of things differently 




disaster which cost us 57,000 lives and a half a trillion dollars.”26     
 Komer designated senior agency officer, Evan J. Parker, Jr., a Cornell graduate who in 
1942 became a member of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), forerunner of the CIA, 
primary responsibility for the creation of Phoenix. Parker had served in Burma during World 
War II, joined the CIA in 1949, and travelled to Vietnam in 1950, where he joined forces with 
Colonel Roger Trinquier, “France’s leading expert in counter-insurgency and opium 
smuggling.”27 After collaborating with other CIA officers, Parker submitted a proposal to Komer 
that outlined the program’s framework. However, after taking the plan to MACV staff on June 
14, 1967, it was rejected.28 Not content with the MACV decision. Komer visited Westmoreland 
and US Ambassador to Vietnam Ellsworth Bunker who both wholeheartedly endorsed it. Parker 
became the director of Phoenix and “overall coordinator in Saigon.”29 He, along with other CIA 
officers, were directed to set up and organize “the new program within CORDS, under the title 
Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation (ICEX).”30 Under ICEX, District Intelligence and 
Operations Coordinating Centers (DIOCCs) were placed in various districts. These centers 
gathered intelligence from different agencies and submitted that information for review. DIOCCs 
also “handled tactical military intelligence and VCI intelligence.”31 Provincial centers in 
Vietnam had already attained effective intelligence coordination, so “the senior CIA officer in 
the province” along with “the province senior advisor supervised the establishment and 
functioning of the DIOCCs.”32 Province Intelligence Coordination Committees functioned to 
attain “cooperation of GVN agencies not tied to the CIA”33      
 Another CIA officer Theodore Shackley, one of the Agency’s most decorated operatives, 
assisted Komer with running the program and recruiting personnel. The CIA recruited Shackley 




headed the CIA operation codenamed JMWAVE, a secret intelligence gathering effort involved 
with the May 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. Five years later, Shackley traveled to Vietnam 
and became station chief in Laos from 1966 to 1968. During that time with Phoenix, he 
“managed (600 military and (40-50) CIA liaison officers) who were working with South 
Vietnamese officers in 40 provinces.”34 Shackley and Komer utilized Cuban refugees who 
served as covert activity officers during “the Bay of Pigs fiasco,” to run “the CIA’s Counter-
Terror (CT) Teams, which were in fact assassination squads.”35 The two bosses along with 
William Colby, future director of Central Intelligence, reported Phoenix efforts to then “DCI 
Richard Helms and the White House.”36                                 
 Another one of the originators of Phoenix was Peer DeSilva, a former World War II 
Army officer who Lyndon Johnson appointed CIA station chief in Saigon following the 
assassination of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem. Seeing the conflict in Vietnam as 
a political struggle, DeSilva advocated a counter insurgency policy to combat the VCI and the 
reign of terror that was being inflicted upon rural South Vietnamese residing in the villages and 
hamlets. As he saw it, the CIA needed “to bring danger and death” to Viet Cong terrorists who 
were furthering the evil Communist cause.37 DeSilva viewed “information management” as 
crucial to winning a war involving political struggles. He perceived counter terrorism as being 
the same as terrorism except that its use against the ‘cold blooded’ VC was justifiable because of 
their malevolent ideology.           
 Peer DeSilva became even more aware of Viet Cong counter insurgency on March 30, 
1965. That day started off like any other for the station chief. After spending some time in the 
morning reviewing his daily tasks, he took a break and went outside to shop for “ceramic 




of his workers, and during the conversation he looked out the window and observed an old 
automobile being pushed up the road in front of the embassy where he worked. Thinking the car 
was broken down, he noticed that the Vietnamese man pushing it suddenly “disappeared up a 
side street and the driver began arguing with the guard who came out to challenge these men.”39 
In the next moment, DeSilva came to a stark realization that the “old grey Peugeot was a car 
bomb.”40 The resulting explosion critically injured him, killed his secretary, “another American, 
a Filipino and nineteen Vietnamese,” besides injuring nearly two hundred other people.41 The 
bombing acted not only to intensify DeSilva’s commitment to counter terror, but also prompted 
Lyndon Johnson to “order the first contingent of American combat troops” in Vietnam, and the 
CIA to revamp and strengthen its counter intelligence operations.42     
 Following the attack, DeSilva was sent to Washington, to serve as special assistant for 
Vietnam affairs to DCI William Francis Raborn Jr. Then in 1966, he became a CIA counter 
insurgency adviser in Thailand. DeSilva wrote several books about his experiences in Vietnam 
and disclosed information related to the genesis of Phoenix. In Sub Rosa, his autobiography, he 
refers to his arrival in Vietnam in 1963, and an introduction to terror, VC style. DeSilva arrived 
in a village and witnessed “three impaled bodies” and an “unborn child lying in the dirt.”43 
Shortly before DeSilva came upon this gruesome sight, “Two VC cadres had impaled a young 
boy, a village chief, and his pregnant wife on sharp poles,” then with a machete “disembowel the 
woman, spilling the fetus onto the ground.”44 DeSilva was responsible for the initial 
development of interrogation centers and the PRUs. He maintained that the military strategy 
known as "counter terror" was a legitimate method of terrorism for utilization in Vietnam’s 
scheme of unconventional conflict, and that it was necessary to tactically apply specific 




the VC. The PRUs were designed with this idea at the forefront and started committing acts of 
terror on VC suspects as early as 1964. At first, the PRUs were referred to as "Counter Terror" 
teams, but then the squads were renamed "Provincial Reconnaissance Units" because the CIA 
"became wary of the adverse publicity surrounding the use of the word 'terror’.”45  
 It must be mentioned that the CIA operates under an us versus them philosophy. In 
Vietnam, the term counter terrorism was just another word for terrorism except that it was 
justifiable since it was being used by us, the CIA, the United States, and “our proxy, the 
Government of Vietnam (GVN),” for the purpose of providing “the GVN with “internal 
security,” against them, the VCI infrastructure.46 With the assistance of the Vietnamese secret 
police, who “established a nation-wide informant network to identify VCI and their 
sympathizers,” CIA undercover agents were able to recruit informants throughout Vietnam.47 To 
facilitate interrogation, torture, and termination, the GVN’s an tri Laws were utilized. Passed in 
1965, "Emergency Decree Law 3/65, 41… provided for "administrative detention of persons 
considered dangerous to the national security, without court hearing."48 Later, the George W. 
Bush administration used the same type of law to detain suspects at Abu Ghraib prison.  
 Preliminary information regarding Phoenix appears in a primary document entitled 
Memorandum from the Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency 
(Carver) to Secretary of Defense McNamara, dated July 26, 1967. The subject addressed in the 
memo is listed as “The Attack on the Communist (Viet Cong) Organization and Its Supporters, 
Particularly at the Village and Hamlet Level.”49 The report identifies five components applicable 
to Phoenix, their objectives and outcomes. The first program listed is the Hamlet Informant 
Program, aimed at “hamlet residents and villagers recruited as secret informants… to report on 




propagandists, tax collectors, etc.), and on members of local guerrilla forces.”50 The memo 
indicates that the program with more than “four thousand informants…recruited (throughout 
South Vietnam)  produces around four thousand reports each month” on activities undertaken 
which includes “identification and biographic information on individual VC and frequently 
include sketches of their location within a hamlet.”51 The Census Grievance Program, whose 
objectives were detailed previously is considered next. The note indicates that “As of 1 June 
1967, approximately 4,000 Census Grievance units with about 5,250 cadre, were providing 
information on VC personnel, installations, caches, etc. These units (one to a hamlet) produce 
about 1,800 reports per month.”52 PICs (fig. 1.2), with an objective to interrogate and exploit 
“captured, arrested and defected Viet Cong” are then discussed.53 The PIC also compiles reports 
and then distributes them “to Vietnamese US/Free World Forces at district, province and higher 
echelons, as appropriate.”54 PRUs, at the time located in 28 provinces, in charge of directing 
“special operations against the VC” were reported to by the end of April, 1967 to have 
“conducted 1,658 operations, from which 2,340 reports were produced. A total of 814 VC 
captured in these operations provided substantial information on the VC organization, from 
hamlet to province level.”55 The memorandum concludes that at an early stage of operations, 
these programs accompanied by ICEX coordination were in place “to achieve a unified line of 
command and a sharp stimulation of anti-infrastructure operations.”56                              
 Christian G. Appy, Professor of History at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst 
argues that since Phoenix utilized assassination in its counter terror campaign, it violated the 
Geneva Convention agreements formulated in 1949, which specify standards pertaining to 
international law and humane treatment of prisoners during war. Article 130 of the convention 




inhuman treatment.”57 Appy contends that since Phoenix relied on assassination as part of the 
neutralization process, it “was a war crime by definition, regardless of debates about whether its 
victims were accurately targeted or not.”58 Originally the term ‘neutralize’ according to Richard 
S. Winslow, a former employee of  the US Agency for International Development (USAID), was 
referred to in “Phoenix program language” as “elimination” but since that word “gave the 
unfortunate impression to some Congressmen and the interested public that someone was being 
eliminated” neutralize became the official designation.59 Appy also maintains that a major 
problem that arose from Phoenix indiscriminate killings is that when operatives went into a 
Vietnamese village and killed or abused family members of a suspected infiltrator, those who 
survived obviously were devastated, and in many cases became “a card-carrying Viet Cong by 
the next afternoon.”60  Retired general Bruce Palmer, who commanded the Ninth Infantry 
Division in Vietnam in 1968, echoes Appy’s sentiments when he states “My objection to… 
[Phoenix] …, was the involuntary assignment of US Army officers to the program. I don't 
believe that people in uniform, who are pledged to abide by the Geneva Conventions, should be 
put in the position of having to break those laws of warfare.”61     
 Standard operating procedures for Phoenix exist in an advisor handbook (fig. 1.5) 
assembled by the US Military Assistance Command. Guidelines promoted assistance for US 
advisors “toward the sustained attack on the VC Infrastructure.”62 The manual provides 
background information on the program, its organization, and procedural rules involving the 
arrest and apprehension of targeted individuals. It also stresses the importance of “widespread 
dissemination of information about the PHUNG HOANG Program,” including face-to-face 
persuasion, posters, handbills, newspapers, leaflets, radio, television and motion pictures.”63 The 




suppressive effect, both real and psychological, on the freedom of movement of the VCI.”64     
 The handbook begins with an introduction by General Creighton W. Abrams, commander 
of the United States Army in Vietnam from 1968-1972. It briefly summarizes the objectives of 
the program, and the purposes of the guidelines required for implementation by advisors. The 
introduction specifies at the outset that the advice provided by all US advisors involved with 
Phung Hoang must be “coordinated and in accordance with the objective of the program.”65 It 
also notes that the “guidelines parallel but do not supplant existing Standard Operating 
Procedures, Directives, Regulations, or Circulars,” and are to be used only as a guide.66 Abrams 
also stipulates that the National Police possesses primary responsibility in the coordination of 
“all agencies” mounting attacks on the VCI.67 All US advisors, not just those assigned to Phung 
Hoang are to use the handbook as a reference.68     
 Information contained in the handbook, related to program operations is particularly 
noteworthy. First, even though the handbook clearly indicates the overriding goal of 
neutralization it never provides a definition of the term. It only mentions data collection and 
reporting applicable to that objective. Second, assimilation of interrogation reporting is outlined, 
but nothing is stated concerning methods to be implemented. Third,  a timeline of investigative 
procedures involving potential VC are listed which include detainment by the National Police for 
up to five days until the individual reaches the Province Interrogation Center where he could be 
kept “for as long as 30 days.”69 At the end of that time, the Province Security Committee (PSC) 
has seven days to either sentence, release, or hold the individual over for “trial by Military 
Court.”70 However, another section of the handbook notes that the PSC “may impose 
administrative detention of up to two years upon those reasonably believed to threaten the 




or prisoners of war (PW). The latter include VC and military personnel, while the former consist 
of “civilian PRP [People’s Revolutionary Party] members and VCI cadre.”72 
 Another handbook issued in 1968 to assist with Phoenix operations was entitled The VC 
Key Organization from Central Level down to Village and Hamlet Levels. This CIA issued 
manuscript delineated the VCI for program advisors. The document provides detailed 
information about the PRP, the NLF and the Liberation Army. The latter two “military units are 
directed and controlled by the PRP.”73 Party structure is also contained in two charts, one 
showing hierarchy “from [Central Office for South Vietnam] (COSVN) to village level,” and the 
other “a typical province party structure,” in “Quang Ngai.”74 The handbook also mentions that 
several sub groups of the NLF were used to integrate various members of Vietnamese society 
into the promotion of the war effort. These include the “Liberation Farmer's Association, the 
Liberation Women's Association, and the Liberation Youth Association.”75    
 The Phoenix program utilized various methods of counter terrorism, referred to by some 
historians as ‘state terrorism,’ during its existence, which lasted until 1972. The objective to 
“neutralize” the VCI, involved blacklisting South Vietnamese civilians who would then “be 
kidnapped, tortured, detained” without a trial, “or even murdered, simply on the word of an 
anonymous informer.”76 CIA agents and assets would infiltrate, capture, interrogate, and if 
needed, assassinate anyone that they determined was supportive of the National Liberation Front 
(NLF) or VCI. Phoenix managers imposed monthly quotas on field support, which reached a 
high of “eighteen hundred neutralizations,” many of which occurred at night and employed 
psychological warfare techniques involving the murder of VCI along with their families. Some 
estimates indicate that “as many as one third of VC targeted for arrest were summarily 




to look as if they had been committed by the enemy.”78      
 This type of propaganda is also known as “‘black backfire’, in which a perpetrator takes 
an action designed to generate outrage against the target, by making the target appear to be the 
perpetrator of an attack.”79 In this case, however, “local Vietnamese villagers” knew the 
countryside so well that “movement in the area was enough to uncover the US falsification.”80 
Thus, the effort further antagonized the Vietnamese “against the US and US-sponsored forces,” 
and produced a “reverse effect to that intended by American planners,” so the “attempt at black 
backfire… failed.”81            
 Phoenix also used other tactics besides torture which are described in the next chapter, 
during its attack on the VCI. Some of these methods preyed on the ideological beliefs of the 
Vietnamese. Edward Lansdale, a Major General in the United States Air Force who served in the 
OSS during World War II, and later with the CIA, perfected some of these methods while 
assisting the Philippines Armed Forces intelligence during their fighting with the Hukbalahap, a 
communist guerrilla movement. In 1959, he was given the task of putting together a course on 
guerilla fighting in the Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. This training 
facility, originally set up at Fort Riley, Kansas in 1950, and moved to North Carolina in 1952 is 
responsible for the recruitment, assessment, selection, training, and education of Special Forces 
in doctrines pertaining to psychological and unconventional methods of combat. While 
developing the course of study, names were proposed that included “counterguerrilla 
operations,” then “counter resistance,” followed by “counter revolutionary,” until finally the 
class was called “Counter Insurgency Operations [CIO].”82 The courses first students, in 1961, 
“were CIA operatives and foreign military officers.”83 However, as the Pentagon progressed in 




complementary instruction was provided through the Air Force and the Navy, “leading to the 
creation in 1962 of the first SEAL (Sea, Air, Land) teams to serve as Naval commandos.”84 With 
the information provided in Edward Lansdale’s CIO, Special Forces moved on to Vietnam and 
some of them became Phoenix operatives and incorporated what they had learned about counter 
insurgency in the fight against the VCI.         
 Lansdale became an expert on the use of psycho terror, while in the Philippines, and took 
advantage of the Filipino’s superstitions regarding vampires, getting “his agents to spread rumors 
that vampires were infesting the area the local guerrillas were camped.”85 After allowing time for 
the message to be delivered, he had his Commandos grab “a guerrilla bringing up the rear of a 
column,” then “drained his body of blood and then left it along the trail to be found the next 
day.”86 The tactic was successful and “the Guerrillas fled the area.”87 Lansdale also had his men 
“paint an eye facing the front door of those they suspected of supporting the guerrillas as a threat 
before later kidnapping killing and torturing them.”88 This tactic was referred to as the “eye of 
God” which acted “to terrify their target and let them know they were being watched.”89 
 In Vietnam, Phoenix operatives used variations of both these strategies. They capitalized 
on Vietnamese beliefs concerning life after death to enhance “additional horror to their 
murders.”90 Since the Vietnamese thought “the liver and the third eye” were essential to 
“reaching heaven,” CIA officers would have their PRU teams “cut out their victim’s pineal gland 
and even have them eat their liver.”91 As a result, this would not only cause their victim’s demise 
but also deny their soul’s a life in the hereafter.92  Operatives would also paint “the eye of god… 
on corpses” and use variations of the technique which included flying “over their targets 
addressing the guerrillas by name and telling them to surrender now before it was too late” and 




Chapter 3             
           
             Phoenix Interrogation Methods  
 The horror! The horror!         
 -Joseph Conrad            
  
Phoenix operatives utilized different techniques during the interrogation process to elicit 
information from potential Vietcong and NLF members. Once a targeted individual was 
captured, the examination process would begin. Methods of torture included: “rape, gang rape.”1 
Other cruel techniques like “waterboarding (fig. 3.4), beatings with rubber hoses and whips, the 
use of dogs to maul prisoners, and electric shock rendered by attaching wires to the genitals or 
other sensitive parts of the body, like the tongue,”2 Some reports indicate that a type of torture 
referred to as the “airplane” was used. This practice involved tying a prisoner’s arms behind their 
back with a rope wound around “a hook on the ceiling, suspending the prisoner in midair, after 
which he or she was beaten.”3 Another method involved placing the suspect in “extended solitary 
confinement” under “indescribably inhumane conditions.”4 One Vietnamese victim accused of 
throwing a bomb, expressed to a translator “that he had been hung up by his thumbs and that 
they beat him real bad.”5 K. Barton Osborn, a military intelligence operative, testified before 
Congress that during the year and a half he served in Phoenix he observed “acts of torture 
including the prodding of a person’s brain with a six inch dowel through his ear.”6 And 
unsurprisingly maintained that “not a single suspect survived interrogation.”7 Osborn also noted 
that “Quite often it was a matter of expediency just to eliminate a person in the field rather than 
deal with the paperwork.”8         
 A further note on waterboarding and its use demonstrates why it once was and remains a 
common method of torture. The practice was first referred to as the “water cure,” in 1902.9 US 




conflict between the United States and indigenous Filipinos fighting for independence from U.S. 
occupation,” were rumored to be practitioners of the ‘cure.’10 Outcry against waterboarding came 
up in hearings before the 1902 Senate Committee on the Philippines. There, Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court William Howard Taft presented a definition of the interrogation technique, while 
commenting on its early use. He stated, “instances of water cure, that torture which I believe 
involves pouring water down the throat so that the man swells and gets the impression that he is 
going to be suffocated and then tells what he knows …was a frequent treatment under the 
Spaniards.”11 The future president went on to say, “American officials did not tolerate such 
abuses and swiftly brought those involved to justice.”12 Many years later in 1968, a photo 
(Appendix) appeared on the front page of the Washington Post showing “a U.S. soldier 
supervising the waterboarding of a captured North Vietnamese soldier near Da Nang. The 
caption said the method induced "a flooding sense of suffocation and drowning meant to make 
him talk.”13 In 2017, Nils Melzer, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on torture, stressed, 
“Without any doubt, waterboarding amounts to torture. Any tolerance, complacence or 
acquiescence with such practice, however exceptional and well-argued, will inevitably lead 
down a slippery slope towards complete arbitrariness and brute force.”14    
 It should be noted that definitions of what constitutes torture vary. Some define it as “the 
infliction of severe physical pain on a defenseless person.”15 Others have referred to the practice 
as “the infliction of any pain on a defenseless individual.”16 Based on the latter definition, it is 
apparent that the vast “majority of South Vietnamese interrogators tortured some or all of the 
Communist prisoners,” in confinement.17 Under Phoenix, “the frequency and method of torture 
varied.”18 A study conducted in 1968, by John Lybrand and Craig Johnstone found widespread 




of these methods.”19             
 In addition, it is important to realize that psychological torture techniques used in 
Phoenix had been codified in 1963, in a classified counterintelligence manual, finally 
declassified in 1997, codenamed KUBARK, “a cryptonym for CIA itself.”20 The agency then 
proceeded to disseminate the new ‘no touch’ practices, referred to as “sensory disorientation,” 
across the globe beginning with the US Agency for International Development (USAID) Office 
of Public Safety, “established by President John F. Kennedy in 1962,” to fight communism.21 
From there the practices were sent “to police departments in Asia and Latin America,” and 
finally in the mid-1970s, to “US Army Mobile Teams active in Central America during the 
1980s.”22 KUBARK’s authors “are anonymous” but were quick to take credit through an 
emphasis on previous psychological research regarding the methods used to question potential 
suspects. As they put it, “one could not mention interrogation techniques without reference to the 
psychological research conducted in the past decade.”23 The manual contains specific references 
to experiments conducted by Donald O. Hebb of McGill University and Donald Wexler of 
Harvard, whose research concluded, “deprivation of sensory stimuli induces regression”  
and “calculated provision of stimuli during interrogation [strengthens] the subject’s tendencies 
toward compliance.”24           
 Steven M. Kleinman, former Director of both the Air Force Combat Interrogation 
Course, and Director of Intelligence at the Personnel Recovery Academy, a unit of the Joint 
Personnel Recovery Agency that serves as Department of Defense agency responsible for 
overseeing Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) training for US military personnel, 
reviewed and prepared a written analysis of the KUBARK manual. He emphasizes that 




unique personalities of the interrogator and the source…. [E]ach interrogation is unique and 
therefore one must be cautious in trying to apply a strategic template that would prove effective 
in each case.”25 Kleinman also argues that a substantial amount “of ‘what we know’ about 
interrogation” which includes, “approach methodology, the detection of deception, and reading 
body language – is…largely unsubstantiated….adulterated by the principles of coercive 
interrogation drawn from studies of Communist methodologies.”26  The KUBARK handbook 
stresses the need for non-coercive methods over coercive techniques, arguing that the latter “may 
prove ultimately counterproductive.”27 The authors also fail to “portray coercive methods as a 
necessary — or even viable — means of effectively educing information.”28 Not particular about 
the ways they conducted interrogations, Phoenix operatives utilized the proven psychological, 
supposedly non-forcible methods, with coercive physical torture that induced pain, suffering and 
sometimes death to break down and neutralize the VCI.     
 KUBARK utilizes information from Lawrence Hinkle Jr. and Harold Wolff who 
“conducted studies of servicemen who had been prisoners of the Communist Chinese” and other 
individuals “subjected to Soviet interrogations.”29 These studies concluded that both China and 
the Soviet Union employed “traditional police-state methods of extracting information from their 
prisoners.”30 The researchers also observed that “in no case is there reliable evidence that 
neurologists, psychiatrists, psychologists or other scientifically trained personnel have designed 
or participated in these police procedures,” or any implication that the methods used “are 
scientifically organized techniques of predictable effectiveness.”31 Referencing Hinkle and 
Wolff, KUBARK mentions a specific caveat regarding coercive police-state techniques used by 
not only the Chinese and the Soviets but also later by Phoenix operatives; “Any attempt to 




fatigue, sleep deprivation, isolation, discomfort, or disturbing emotional states carries with it the 
hazard of producing inaccuracy and unreliability.”32 Even with this warning, paradoxically the 
manual stresses that the interrogator should “exploit every available advantage aggressively,” to 
accomplish “his true goal-the acquisition of all needed information by any authorized means.”33  
 Witnesses to torture inflicted by interrogators include various groups and individuals. A 
team of American Quaker relief workers visited a PIC in Quang Ngai province and reported that 
several prisoners “had been severely beaten or forced to drink whitewash,” a mixture of salt, 
lime, and water used in painting.34 While visiting “the prison ward of the province hospital, they 
saw three prisoners who spent eleven, thirteen, and fifteen months, respectively, handcuffed to 
their beds.”35 When the workers voiced their objections to the harsh treatment of these 
individuals, “South Vietnamese officials” as well as their “American province advisers” 
informed them that “they would no longer be allowed to see patients who were prisoners.”36 
 Testimony from Phoenix team members corroborates the torture that was an integral part 
of the operation. One CIA agent stationed “at the National Interrogation Center in Saigon” 
related to Anthony Russo, mentioned later in this paper, how he had witnessed many incidents 
that involved “the Agency’s torture techniques, including in one case the hanging of a man by 
his feet while a piano wire noose was slipped around his genitals.”37 According to Russo, the 
operative smiled “as he told him that the prisoner never talked.”38 Further examples of torture 
inflicted by Phoenix interrogators came out in 1972 Congressional hearings. They described 
atrocities such as pushing interviewees out of planes, cutting off their “fingers, ears and testicles” 
and ramming “electric probes into the rectums of others.”39 
 Another example of torture was inflicted upon Nguyen Van Tai, who, according to 




captured.”40 While detained, Phoenix operatives subjected him to multiple methods of hostile 
interrogation including “electro-torture, water torture, beatings, stress positions, sleep 
deprivation,” and confinement “in a freezing refrigerated room with white walls and no windows 
for two years.”41 Remarkably, after undergoing all these harrowing practices, Tai never 
confessed his true identity or provided any other useful information, emphasizing to his captors 
that his role was one of “a simple farmer who came south to support the liberation forces.”42 
Tai’s case was one like many others where “responsiveness to traditional interrogation 
techniques…hardened his resistance.43 Unfortunately, as records provided in this paper indicate 
there were also thousands of Phoenix victims who succumbed to the agony brought on by their 
captors, confessed to being a VC, and ended up dead.       
 Snepp authored an international best seller entitled Decent Interval: The American 
Debacle in Vietnam and the Fall of Saigon. The book is a scathing critique of the CIA and the 
United States exit from Vietnam. Snepp includes in his narrative, experiences with Phoenix and 
“the months he spent torturing Nguyen Van Tai.”44 After inflicting the previously  described 
coercive methods on the suspected Vietcong cadre, Snepp received a command from a “senior 
CIA official” that Tai should be made to disappear.45 So in response to a direct order, he was put 
on board “an airplane and thrown out over the South China Sea.”46 Of course as Robert Burns 
once wrote “The best-laid plans of mice and men often go awry,” this was the case with Tai, 
since he “survived” and later served “in the National Assembly” and received “his country’s 
highest wartime decoration.”47                
  Oher examples of torture used by Phoenix interrogators include the following. A 
Vietnamese woman who would not talk to an interviewer had a wet rag soaked in lye soap 




allowed her to take a breath to avoid suffocation and then quickly proceeded to slap the cloth 
“back against her face.”48 The woman then began gagging and finally “started to speak in sobs” 
providing the interrogator with “the information he sought.”49 Another particularly gruesome 
account mentions how a detainee had one of their “eyeballs gouged out with a spoon.”50 Yet 
another technique involved using “K-bars [combat knives] to saw on people till they got down to 
the bone.”51             
 A unique mission undertaken by Phoenix that exemplifies torture inflicted via medical 
experimentation occurred in July 1968. CIA psychologists, accompanied by a skilled 
neurosurgeon and a neurologist organized a laboratory at Bien Hoa Prison near Saigon where 
suspected NLF members, gathered up by Phoenix squads were being detained.52  The CIA had 
previously administered LSD to NLF officers, “hoping that by inducing irrational behavior, the 
seemingly unbreakable solidarity of their captives could be broken, and that other inmates” 
would start talking.53 Since this method failed to prove successful, the psychologists decided to 
conduct other experiments. In one, after administering anesthesia, tiny electrodes were implanted 
in the brains “of three Vietcong prisoners.”54 Following this operation, the CIA doctors used 
“radio frequencies … to cause their subjects suddenly to defecate or vomit.”55 Once this 
procedure was completed, the subjects were placed in a room and provided with knives. The CIA 
men, secretly viewing the activity, would then press “the control buttons on their handsets,” in an 
attempt “to arouse their subjects to violence.”56 The objective was to use the experiments to 
prompt the prisoners to attack each other. After unsuccessful attempts to induce violence lasting 
the duration of a week, the scientists gave up, and the Vietcong guinea pigs “were shot by Green 
Beret troopers and their bodies burned.”57       




involved a common Phoenix interrogation tool, electroshock. In 1966, the CIA sent three 
psychiatrists to Saigon, including Dr. Lloyd Cotter, a teaching consultant at Pacific State 
Hospital in California.58 Utilizing a Page-Russell electroshock device, the doctors attempted to 
depattern, or remove normal patterns of thinking and behavior, from Vietcong prisoners, who 
were “classified as ‘typical cases of Communist indoctrination’.”59 The first soldier was shocked 
multiple times over the course of a week, and Dr. Cotter observed “evident improvement in [his] 
behavior.”60 However, even though this was noted, the man was administered an additional 
“sixty electro-shocks,” and “died.”61 Not content with the results of his experiments, Cotter 
administered “several thousand shock treatments” over the summer, and at the end of “three 
weeks, the last Vietcong prisoner was dead.”62 The CIA physicians, finally realizing the failure 
of electroconvulsive treatment to break the VC, boxed up the Page-Russell and flew home to 
Langley.            
 The CIA had been experimenting with various types of mind control for many years 
beginning with the establishment of MKULTRA in 1953. At that time, during the Cold War, the 
United States was worried that the USSR, China, and North Korea were utilizing mind control 
through the brainwashing of POWs in Korea. The foundational philosophy behind this operation 
was that drugs or interrogation procedures could weaken an individual causing them to elicit 
confessions and thus enhance intelligence gathering. Besides experiments like the ones 
mentioned in the previous paragraph involving electrodes, and LSD, hypnosis, sensory 
deprivation, isolation, verbal and sexual abuse, and various other forms of torture were 
employed. Many of these same techniques carried over from MKULTRA into the Phoenix 
repertoire of terror. Facilitated by an unlimited budget and unchecked power, Phoenix involved a 




Encompassing a strategy of questioning suspects through the infliction of torture, “Phoenix was 
the culmination of the CIA’s mind-control project.”64       
 Some scholars, such as Mark Moyar, Director of the Project on Military and Diplomatic 
History at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a think tank located at Georgetown 
University, have concluded that the torture administered through Phoenix was promoted 
primarily within the ranks of members who were part of the Government of the Republic of 
Vietnam (GVN). He contends, “most GVN leaders allowed or even encouraged their 
subordinates to torture their prisoners.”65 Conversely, CIA trainers and US military personnel 
attempted to circumvent efforts on the part of American and GVN workers to conduct torture. 
They were instructed that if the inhumane practices could not be deterred, to exit the scene. The 
contention of American leaders was that “torture only caused prisoners to blurt out lies to save 
themselves and that it was immoral.”66 Moyar does admit however, that the occurrence of torture 
“depended heavily on the beliefs of the people with immediate access to prisoners.”67 
 Moyar also argues that torture utilized by Phoenix operatives was effective in eliciting 
information from the enemy. He bases this claim on interviews he conducted with both 
Americans and South Vietnamese advisers. As he puts it, “so many American and Vietnamese 
interviewees testified to the effectiveness of torture that there can be no doubt that it extracted 
useful information in some cases.”68  He also compliments “the ability of the interrogators to 
distinguish fact from fiction” which permitted “them to discern lies.”69 However, his position is 
not supported by information in the Phoenix database analyzed by Kalyvas and Kocher discussed 
earlier in this thesis. Besides that, Moyar indicts his own claim when he provides a quote from 
John Mullins, a former Green Beret and Studies and Observations Group (SOG) officer in 1968-




people under physical duress, they’ll tell you anything, just to get you to stop hurting them.”70  
 Further disagreement with Moyar’s take on Phoenix comes from Jeremy Kuzmarov, 
assistant professor of history at Tulsa University. He spent several months studying data about 
Phoenix contained in the USAID’s Public Safety Division files. After reviewing that information 
and the perspective presented by Moyar, he argues that the PRUs, consisting of “50-to-100-man 
strike forces,” should not be praised for their efforts.71 Instead, he indicates that the CIA backed 
units “served as one of the most brutal and corrupt colonial proxies of the United States in its 
history.”72 He describes the Phoenix teams as “hunter-killer squadrons” whose primary objective 
“was to eliminate the “Vietcong” infrastructure (VCI) through use of sophisticated computer 
technology and intelligence gathering techniques and through improved coordination of military 
and civilian intelligence agencies.”73 Contrary to Moyar’s defense of the operation, Kuzmarov 
contends, “the PRUs partook in indiscriminate brutality, failed to infiltrate the upper-echelon of 
the revolutionary apparatus,” besides being “riddled by inaccurate reporting and bribery.”74 His 
basis for these claims can be found in “internal reports on record at the National Archives,” 
which show that PRU teams “used their positions for revenge purposes and for shakedowns and 
extortion, threatening to kill people and count them as VCI if they did not pay them huge 
sums.”75 Since the South Vietnamese army, formed by the United States had such a high number 
of defectors, many of those recruited into service “were criminals or thugs who used the program 
to advance their own agendas.”76 Confirmation of this contention comes from Elton Manzione, a 
Phoenix agent who stated that the PRUs were made up of “a combination of ARVN deserters, 
VC turncoats and bad motherfuckers; criminals the South Vietnamese couldn’t deal with who 
were turned over to us. Some actually had an incentive plan: If they killed X number of 




 Kuzmarov also criticizes Moyar on his claims that veterans who testified about Phoenix 
brutality, such as K. Barton Osborn, possessed a lack of credibility since they were 
psychologically traumatized from their experiences while fighting in Vietnam.  Kuzmarov claims 
this to be a common tactic used by defenders of the American war effort, which is false. As 
support for his claim he cites the work of Deborah Nelson and Nick Turse, who surveyed 
hundreds of declassified files at the National Archives, and discovered “that the army in fact 
investigated many of the allegations of atrocities by antiwar veterans which turned out to be 
almost all accurate.”78           
 The Province Interrogation Centers (PICs), first “opened in August 1965 at Nha Trang, in 
Central Vietnam,” were designed and built to facilitate the questioning and detainment of 
potential Vietcong.79 They were constructed “by a CIA front company Pacific Architects and 
Engineers (PA&E).”80 The centers were eventually placed in all of South Vietnam’s 44 
provinces (fig. 3.1).81 Phoenix managed, supervised, and incorporated most of the CT [Counter 
Terror] teams” in the PICs (fig. 3.2).82 During the interrogative process, “the CIA learned the 
identity and structure of the VCI in each province.”83 The buildings were one story high and 
composed of small rooms and a cellblock with “twenty to sixty solitary confinement cells the 
size of closets.”84 The cells had a slot at the top where you could view the prisoner and an 
opening at the bottom through which food could be passed. No toilets were placed in the 
cubicles, instead inmates merely used a hole in the floor when they had to urinate or have a 
bowel movement. Beds for the prisoners consisted of concrete slabs and depending on how 
cooperative they were with the PIC operators, some might obtain “a straw mat or a blanket” to 
help keep them warm, since “it could get very cold at night in the highlands.”85 Imprisonment 




merely sat in their cells when they were not being questioned. After finally leaving the PIC, they 
were either “sent to the local jail, or were turned over to the military, where they were put in 
POW camps or taken out and shot.”86         
 CIA officers in the PICs oversaw interrogation of nonmilitary prisoners. These advisers 
chose South Vietnamese to conduct the questioning and sometimes conducted the interview 
themselves through an interpreter.87 However, these translators “were not always reliable,” and 
the Vietnamese detainees were predisposed not to “answer questions directly and immediately,” 
especially when the ones asking the questions were foreigners.88 Thus, US interrogators were not 
as likely to formulate “the best way to structure the sessions.”89 Compounding this problem was 
the fact that “the GVN often held more prisoners than the Americans could handle by 
themselves.”90           
 Orrin DeForest, former Special Agent for the Air Force Office of Special Investigations 
(AFOSI), served in the Army’s Criminal Investigation Division (CID) as a warrant officer during 
his assignment in Vietnam from 1966 to 1967.91 He provides firsthand information concerning 
interrogation methods used in PICs.92 At the end of his service with CID, DeForest became a 
CIA contractor, and “chief interrogator for Military Region Three” based out of Saigon.93 There, 
in Bien Hoa province he oversaw “interrogations of Vietcong prisoners housed at the PIC,” 
trained “South Vietnamese interrogators,” and identified “prisoners who could be recruited as 
informants and used to infiltrate their former Vietcong units.”94         
 While serving as chief interrogator, DeForest was provided with four teenage Vietnamese 
‘experts’ to assist with intelligence gathering.95 Frustrated with these youngsters endeavors he 
made sure they stayed in the PIC while he travelled across the region and assessing “CIA 




of a 15 year old female suspect, by his young ‘experts.’ To aid them in questioning the young 
woman, the teenagers had inserted “a broomstick into her vagina.”97 DeForest then discovered 
that “his South Vietnamese counterparts in the PICs,” commonly used torture to get prisoners to 
divulge information.98 Their inability to gather and assimilate “intelligence for use in 
interrogations had resulted in a lack of leverage over prisoners,” and torture became the means to 
an end, regardless of the degree of pain and suffering it caused the victim.      
 Orrin DeForest was an extremely skilled interrogator. After witnessing methods of 
coercive torture, he became convinced that there were much better techniques that could be used 
to generate reliable intelligence. As opposed to information gathering via harsh interrogation 
practices which “had no way of producing except by beating the hell out of suspects,” and “no 
way to verify the stories,” DeForest concluded that building a “rapport with interrogatees by 
treating them with sincerity and kindness,” was a far superior method.99 After utilizing this 
system for several years, he organized a team that did not torture and that built a database of 
some twenty thousand cards.”100 However, even though “DeForest’s interrogation operation was 
both comprehensive and effective,” in the latter years of US involvement in Vietnam, the CIA 
preferred torture practices administered  in Phoenix as a mainstay of counterinsurgency efforts 




          Chapter 4    
          Phoenix: Perspectives and Impacts     
  
 The meaning of this program, like much of war, remains an enigma surrounded by controversy.   
 -Richard A. Hunt           
  
 Analysis of the effectiveness of Phoenix as a counterinsurgency tool is mixed. Douglas 
Blaufarb, a former CIA operations officer and station chief in Laos, who became a security 
affairs analyst for the Rand Corporation after he retired, calls the operation a failure.1 What 
started out as an endeavor which attempted to promote management through the integration of 
“scattered and diverse efforts by often competing and duplicating units,” and “eliminate 
inefficiencies” aimed at “what many believed to be the enemy jugular,” the program ended up 
being a “mismarriage of enthusiastic American managerial technique with Vietnamese 
indifference.”2          
 Blaufarb contends that assumptions on the part of the military and US intelligence were 
made regarding operational issues that damaged Phoenix objectives and diminished pacification. 
The first of these expectations was that “Vietnamese intelligence services could be forced to 
cooperate, share information, and contribute qualified personnel to a combined effort.”3 
Unfortunately, cooperation could not be coerced, information sharing was inadequate, and those 
individuals assigned to the program by the military and Vietnamese police “were their least 
valued personnel.”4 These workers had other thoughts on their minds such as personal 
advancement since they were “in competition with rival services.”5 By combining effort in a 
location “where service identity was merged in a larger whole,” their ambitions were perceived 
to be stifled.6            
 A study mentioned previously conducted by John G. Lybrand and L. Craig Johnstone 




The two CORDS evaluators were assigned the task of analyzing the program’s methods in 
attacking the VCI “infrastructure in II Corps.”7 They noted the following problems. First, their 
assessment revealed “a critical lack of qualified interrogators,” which promoted poor questioning 
methods.8 The researchers also discovered an “inadequacy of reaction forces at district 
level,…improper use of Field Police Forces; torture of prisoners; lack of a standardized filing 
system; poor source control mechanisms; lack of coordination between Phoenix and other free 
world forces; and Census Grievance participation.”9 Lybrand and Johnstone also conclude that 
these debilitating issues inherent in II Corps “held true in the other three corps areas of Vietnam 
as well.”10             
 Further information regarding the Census Grievance Program is relevant to a discussion 
of impacts. At the same time that CIA officers utilized this secret program to discover 
intelligence in villages controlled by the VC, “CIA police advisers were conducting a census 
program of their own.”11 This approach originated from British counterinsurgency specialist 
Robert Thompson who “the State Department hired in 1961 to advise the US on police 
operations in South Vietnam.”12 Thompson used this type of system in dealing with the Malayan 
Emergency. His idea incorporated “a three-pronged approach that coordinated military, civilian 
intelligence, and police agencies in a concerted attack on the Viet Cong Infrastructure.”13          
 In 1962, the National Police took Thompson’s proposal and created the Family Census 
program, which comprised a list of individuals “and a group photo taken of every family in 
South Vietnam.”14 The photograph were placed in “a police dossier” accompanied by “each 
person’s political affiliations, fingerprints, income, savings, and other relevant information, such 
as who owned property or had relatives outside the village, and thus had a legitimate reason to 




into working in their villages as informers.”16 By 1965, 7,453 families were registered.17 
 The Family Census program allowed the CIA to learn whom the “Communist cell 
members” were in the villages under government control.18 Once they learned the names, agents 
could then arrest minor suspects and ‘soften them up’ until they revealed their leaders.19 This 
tactic’s objective was to diminish the insurgency through the forceful migration of political 
cadres into “guerrilla units in the jungle,” which would deprive the VC infrastructure of its 
leadership in South Vietnamese villages and hamlets.20 The practical application of this endeavor 
did produce results since “many VCI were not terrorists,” as David Galula observes, but “men 
whose motivations, even if the counterinsurgent disapproves of them, may be perfectly 
honorable. They do not participate directly, as a rule, in direct terrorism or guerrilla action and, 
technically, have no blood on their hands.”21       
 Nevertheless, problems with this aspect of the program did occur. Some innocent 
villagers, with no connection to the Viet Cong became victims of torture or faced extortion by 
crooked police.22 In some cases, VCI who were actually double agents convinced “CIA 
‘contractors’ to arrest people hostile to the insurgency.”23 With these problems in mind, 
Thompson urged the CIA to create “a police special branch of professional interrogators who 
would not be confused with mercenary contractors.”24 So, in 1964, the Police Special Branch 
was organized and placed “in Province Intelligence Coordinating Committees (PICCs) in South 
Vietnam’s 44 provinces.”25 These CIA run committees strived, “to coordinate paramilitary 
kidnapping and assassination operations with the intelligence operations of the Special Branch.”                            
 Perspectives from other individuals concerning the implementation of Phoenix assist in 
answering questions about the efficacy of the operation. William Colby, Director of the Central 




1971. In 1972, Colby wrote a letter to Edward Shearer, editor of Parade, in response to an article 
published in the magazine’s January 9, 1972, issue, which claimed that the CIA run Phoenix had 
“established a new high for U.S. political assassinations in Vietnam.”26 Colby responded by 
noting that the operation “was run not by the CIA but by the Government of Vietnam, with the 
support of the CORDS [Civil Operations and Rural Development Support] clement of the U.S. 
Military Assistance Command in coordination with several U.S. agencies including CIA.”27 He 
also vehemently denied that Operation Phoenix was “a program of assassination,” and those that 
were killed during the operation’s efforts met their demise “in firefights during military 
operations or resisting capture.”28 His argument maintained, “there is a vast difference in kind, 
not merely in degree, between these combat casualties, (even including the few abuses which 
occurred) and the victims of the Viet Cong's systematic campaign of terrorism."29 Previously, 
Mr. Colby testified before Congress in 1971, that deaths from Phoenix “included ‘illegal 
killing.”30           
 Colby also provided additional information about Phoenix which acted to both confirm as 
well as deny reported allegations that had come out during the operation’s first two years of 
existence. The MACV issued directive 525-36, drafted by Colby, and signed by Major General 
W.G. Dolvin, dated May 18, 1970, explains the program’s activity.31 This document, entitled 
“Military Operations Phoenix—Phung Hoang---Operations,” lays out “policies and 
responsibilities for all US personnel participating in, or supporting in any way, Phoenix (Phung 
Hoang) operations.”32 The directive authorizes “as a final resort the use of military, or police 
force against” the VCI, and then makes clear that all “US personnel…are specifically 
unauthorized to engage in assassinations or the rules of land warfare, but they are entitled to use 




eliminating the VCI in the RVN.”33 The MACV order also mentions that if US staff members 
notice Vietnamese not following “the rules of land warfare” they are “not to participate further in 
the activity” make objections known to “the Vietnamese conducting them” and “report the 
circumstances” to “higher US authority.”34Lastly, the document indicates that “if an individual 
finds the police type activities of the Phoenix program repugnant” he can “be reassigned from 
the program without prejudice.”35            
 It should be noted that Colby’s directive implies that problems existed with the 
implementation of Phoenix. After all, why would an administrator issue a command that focuses 
on issues of abuse or tactics of terror unless these matters either existed, had been reported as 
occurrences, or were perceived as reality by certain members of the public. If things had been 
going smoothly with Phoenix, no torture, no murders, no violations of program responsibilities, 
there would have been no need to put out a directive. But, any operation that incorporates the 
concept of neutralization of the enemy as an objective, however narrowly defined, and chooses 
to integrate both coercive and non-coercive methods of interrogation as part of that process sets 
itself up for problems based on the strategy itself. This was especially true in Vietnam, with the 
plans “set up by Americans on American assumptions, in support of American policies,” not 
applicable to South Vietnamese culture.36 When men are given power over other men and 
permitted to torture them, undesirable and unethical consequences can result. William Colby 
defended Phoenix until the day he died, but if his strategy had worked he never would have 
needed to.               
 Another Agency perspective regarding the quality of counteracted targets comes from a 
person directly involved with Phoenix, Ralph McGehee. He served as the CIA chief in the Gia 




with the operation, expressing emphatically in his memoirs that “never in the history of our work 
in Vietnam did we get one clear-cut, high-ranking Vietcong agent.”37 His claim finds support in 
both a 1971 Pentagon study, which disclosed, “that only 3 percent of the Vietcong killed, 
captured or rallied were full or probationary party members above the district level,” and 
provincial accounts, which maintained “that 1 percent or less of enemy neutralizations held key 
leadership posts in the VCI.”38 McGehee contends that one of the primary reasons Phoenix failed 
“stemmed from the popular support enjoyed by the NLF leadership who had contacts in high 
places and infiltrated the government apparatus.”39      
 Victor Marchetti, a former special assistant to the Deputy Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency and John D. Marks, a former officer at the United States Department of 
State, provide material about Phoenix. The two men co-authored a book entitled The CIA and the 
Cult of Intelligence, published in 1974, which discusses how the CIA works along with its 
obsession with clandestine undertakings. The agency attempted to halt publication of the work, 
based on national security, but was unable to do so. However, 168 lines of the narrative were 
redacted prior to publication. There are references made in the book to Phoenix, including a 
quote by Wayne Cooper, mentioned later in this chapter, who states that “CIA representatives 
recruited, organized, supplied, and directly paid CT teams, whose function was to use Vietcong 
techniques of terror — assassination, abuses, kidnappings and intimidation — against the 
Vietcong leadership.”40 The authors indicate that according to South Vietnamese estimates, the 
operation accounted for “40,994 VC kills,” compared to Colby’s figure of 20, 587 suspected 
Vietcong …killed under Phoenix in its first two and a half years.”41 Marchetti also reflected on 
Phoenix in an interview published in 1974. When asked about the operation being a ‘murder 




torture he found out about after leaving the agency. He states, “I learned from guys coming back 
from Vietnam that we used to do things like put a dowel in a guy's ear and tap it until he talked, 
or we split his head apart. We'd put electrical wires on his genitals and we'd grind the crank until 
the guy went out of his mind or talked.”43        
 Another individual who acquired information that sheds light on Phoenix is Anthony 
Russo. He worked for the RAND Corporation, a global policy think tank, which sent him to 
Vietnam to explore interrogation techniques in use on Vietnamese prisoners. While at RAND, he 
developed a friendship with Daniel Ellsberg and assisted him in the writing of the Pentagon 
Papers, published in 1971, that disclosed various activities that transpired during the Vietnam 
War. While Russo was in Vietnam, he prepared a torture report describing multiple atrocities 
“when the CIA’s use of torture expanded dramatically under the notorious Phoenix Program.”44 
At that time, the CIA supervised “three separate operations that employed torture: its own 
interrogation centers, 40 provincial interrogation centers run by Vietnamese with CIA training 
and supervision and a training program that schooled 85,000 Vietnamese police in torture 
techniques, part of a worldwide operation.”45 Unfortunately, the RAND Corporation “either 
destroyed Russo’s report or has kept it in its classified archives for the past 50 years.”46 
 Additional perspectives on the impact of Phoenix come from various Communist leaders. 
Justice Truong Nhu Tang, a VC Minister of Justice, reported in his memoirs that, “In some 
locations… Phoenix was dangerously effective.”47 He also notes that in “the Hau Nghia 
Province,” the VCI “infrastructure was virtually eliminated.”48 A colonel, Bui Tin, in an 
interview with journalist Stanley Karnow, maintained that the operation resulted in the deaths of 
“thousands of our cadres.”49 General Tran Do, also interviewed by Karnow, described Phoenix 




found “that most communist leaders had not changed their interpretation.”51    
 Further discussion on Phoenix efforts in the Hau Nghia province provides insight into the 
program’s effectiveness. Eric M. Bergerud, Professor of History and Humanities at Lincoln 
University in Oakland California, has done extensive research on the history of the war in Hau 
Nghia. In the introduction to his book The Dynamics of Defeat: The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia 
Province, he notes “that the problems facing the Americans in Vietnam were insurmountable 
once President Lyndon Johnson decided to intervene.”52 These problems can be demonstrated 
through a four-point analysis of Hau Nghia province. First, Bergerud points out that “the 
Government of Vietnam (GVN) lacked legitimacy with the rural peasantry, the largest segment 
of its population,” because they “perceived the GVN to be aloof, corrupt and inefficient.”53 
Second, the National Liberation Front backed by the Communists possessed tremendous power 
in the province, and even though it employed ruthless methods, it “enjoyed widespread support 
among the peasantry.”54 Third, Americans attempted to change “the political allegiance of the 
rural population” but this failed “because of the structural weaknesses of the GVN and the grim 
tenacity of the Front.”55 Fourth, use of “military force, much of it American, was the only 
method through which the allies could combat the Front,” however, “the long war of attrition 
required to weaken the NLF was simultaneously a crushing burden on the US Army and led 
inevitably to a steady decline in public support for the war effort.”56   
 Bergerud devotes an entire chapter of his book to Phoenix. He mentions that in the early 
1960s before the program was set up, the CIA, concerned about the Communist Party’s influence 
in Vietnam, started gathering intelligence on “the Front’s political apparatus and opened an 
interrogation center in Saigon.”57 The PRUs (fig. 3.3) put in place in Hau Nghia were only 




Agency operatives “with only nominal direction or oversight from the GVN.”59 And even though 
CORDS was placed in charge of integration at all levels, “CIA activities were largely exempt.”60 
In an analysis of the PRUs, Bergerud notes that there were conflicting reports on their success. 
However, he does note that they “were considered proportionately, the most effective 
organization in the fight against the Front’s apparatus.”61      
 The conclusion reached by Eric Bergerud after his intensive study of Phoenix in the Hau 
Nghia province was that the operation was merely “another paper exercise with little real 
value.”62 Bearing this out were estimates from CORDS that by early 1970, three years after 
Phoenix had risen, “980 Front cadres were still operating in Hau Nghia.”63 The NLF’s political 
power continued to grow in strength as summarized by a provincial senior advisor who stated, 
“VC retain a viable political apparatus” and “local party infrastructure appear to be policing their 
ranks and learning how to survive in the pacification environment” with at least a skeleton 
infrastructure in every village.”64 He also describes Phoenix as “one of the most important, if not 
most conspicuous, failures of the entire American war effort.”65    
 John Jacob Nutter, an historical researcher and former assistant professor at Michigan 
State University contends that Phoenix was originally intended to assist in unravelling “the VC 
organization,” with an objective to gain the trust of members “and ‘turn’ them via the Chieu Hoi 
(“Open Arms”) program,” an initiative designed by the South Vietnamese to encourage 
defection.66 However, Nutter argues that the operation metamorphosed and “took on a dirty life 
of its own,” producing “little intelligence of value.”67 With strong ties prevalent in Vietnamese 
families, suspected VCIs faced betrayal in the “PRUs based more on family animosity than 
Vietcong intelligence value.”68 He surmises that there is a great likelihood “many suspects didn’t 




Agency itself still maintain that Phoenix was not an “assassination program,” Nutter contends 
there is absolutely no doubt that the covert operation “resulted in the outright killing of many 
suspects with no pretense made of attempting capture or interrogation.”70 He also maintains that 
in some instances American Special Forces were provided with explicit commands “to shoot 
suspects.”71 These included “VC sympathizers or cadres, as well as South Vietnamese 
collaborators and double agents.”72 Information from two army officers involved with Phoenix, 
Army Lieutenants’ Francis T. Reitemeyer and Michael J Cohn, confirms this claim.73 These men 
received honorable discharges from the military because they demonstrated to a federal court 
that they were required “to fulfill a ‘kill quota’” of fifty bodies a month.74 Nutter also suggests 
that the reason so many suspected VCI did not talk was that they were simply not a part of the 
shadow government, and “in fact, innocent.”75         
 Vincent Okamoto, a former Army 2nd Lieutenant and the most decorated Japanese 
American to serve in Vietnam provides additional insight into Phoenix operations related to 
finding blacklisted Viet Cong. In 1968, he served in the program as an intelligence liaison 
officer, and after the war went to law school and eventually became a judge. Okamoto observed 
that when going into villages to look for suspects, difficulties would arise. Out of fear, most 
villagers would not reveal any information as to where the individual resided. Once a frightened 
villager did reveal the suspect’s residence, that person was fair game for Phoenix operatives. 
Their reasoning was that when they returned later to neutralize the located suspect, it really was 
of no consequence who was killed, because “as far as they were concerned whoever answered 
the door was a Communist, including family members.”76 Okamoto also notes that in some 
cases, Phoenix agents would return, “to camp with ears to prove that they killed people.”77 




Nghia province from 1971 to 1972, “was responsible for advising the South Vietnamese military 
and its police counterparts” in neutralization efforts against the VC.78 He provides a contrasting 
personal perspective on the effectiveness of the program in Duc Hue, “one of the most infiltrated 
districts in South Vietnam.”79 When first assigned to Phoenix, he observed that South 
Vietnamese officials failed to “aggressively attack the Vietcong.”80 Even though Herrington was 
not a trained interrogator, since his associates were not providing enough support, he started 
conducting “unilateral debriefings of Vietcong defectors.”81 Through these sessions Herrington 
learned about the “hidden realities of the insurgency in Vietnam,” and surmised that inabilities 
on the part of American advisers to understand these realities stymied “efforts to build effective 
collaboration with South Vietnamese allies.”82       
 By using the South Vietnamese Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) initiative, aimed at encouraging 
Vietcong “to defect, or ‘rally’ to the government,” Herrington was able to secure the assistance 
of two ‘ralliers’ (hoi chanh), Nguyen Van Dung, a former Hiep Hoa village secretary, and  
Nguyen Van Phich, a native of the village of Tan My, and former “executive officer for the 
Vietcong local force company.”83 Herrington treated Dung hospitably, and demonstrated that he 
was difficult to mislead. After gaining the defector’s respect Herrington was able to obtain 
information that promoted his understanding of the South Vietnamese. With Phich’s help, he was 
able “to create and manage a large network of informants in Tan My, the ‘model revolutionary 
village.’”84 As a result of the intelligence gathered from Phich, “an aggressive province chief 
Colonel Thanh launched military operations against the Vietcong” and successfully broke “their 
hold on Tan My.”85            
 Herrington claims that Phoenix procedures worked in “varying degrees in many 




certain districts. Rewards were offered to anyone who would provide information about 
Vietcong operatives. The program ended up being “a major thorn in the side of” VCI, who saw 
“it as a threat to their organizational and operational security.”87 Herrington argues that Phoenix 
was a major reason “why the Vietcong’s Provincial Revolutionary Government,” failed “to take 
control of South Vietnam in the wake of the collapse in 1975.”88 As a result, many thousands of 
Communist leaders required “to run the new government” had either been killed or placed in 
prison, “thanks to Phoenix.”89                              
 Wayne L. Cooper, a onetime Foreign Service officer, who served for almost 18 months 
as a Phoenix advisor in Can Tho, a city located in the southern part of the Mekong Delta region, 
reflects on the operation in an article published in the Washington Post June 8, 1972. Phoenix is 
described as a “disreputable, CIA-inspired effort,” and “a bloody, handed assassination program” 
which was a fiasco and “a failure.”90 Cooper notes that the operation failed for several reasons, 
many of which stemmed from Vietnamese deficiencies. Any successes of the program were 
manifested in such a way that “none of us intended or would have wanted.”91    
 After providing a history of Phoenix, Cooper notes that by mid-1968, the operation had 
violated “the cardinal rule of intelligence” since it had become too large and encompassing.92 
The idea of ‘neutralization’ of the VC infrastructure became the number one priority, endorsed 
by founder “Robert Komer, Gen. William C. Westmoreland, prominent journalists, political 
scientists,” and “even Sir Robert Thompson, President Nixon's personal counterinsurgency 
expert,” who stated, “if the VCI could be eliminated, one could confidently buy stock in South 
Vietnam.”93 With this objective placed at paramount importance, by mid-1969 CORDS had 
begun utilizing “Army advisers and a few civilians,” of which Cooper was one.94 With increased 




from the US, construction of interrogation centers, gathering and dissemination of information 
on VC infiltrators, capture, examination, and prosecution.95 At least, that was the idea of how the 
operation should unfold.         
 Unfortunately, during his time as an advisor Wayne Cooper discovered that 
implementation of the program suffered from many weaknesses. First, emphasis generated by 
commanders was lacking “from Saigon all the way down to the districts.”96 Even though 
everyone believed in the prime directive, since the budget was small, interrogators utilized at the 
centers by “the various police~type agencies were often the least talented or experienced 
individuals available.”97 Second, the South Vietnamese were not provided with information 
about Phoenix and therefore it’s practice could not gain their trust. When asked about the 
program, one villager’s perception was, “it’s a government program to catch young men for the 
army.”98 Also, the operation alienated “rural folk by causing inconvenience and harassment” like 
making them “sit in the sun for hours while ID cards” were examined.99 Third, directional impact 
in the PICs was deficient “at all levels” with no centralized guidance in intelligence gathering or 
collating of that data.100 Fourth, targeting of suspected individuals lacked specificity. Cooper 
contends that as little as “5 per cent of the hundreds of daily required” Phoenix excursions “went 
to a specific location to capture a specific individual” while the other 95 per cent “were massive 
group exercises” with soldiers sweeping through an area and detaining “every adult they came 
across.”101 ID cards would then be inspected against a blacklist that “was never up to date” with 
the occasional capture of a “VC or North Vietnamese soldier” while VCI were rarely 
apprehended, “if at all, and usually released for lack of evidence.”102 Finally, the “judicial 
aspect” of the operation is described by Cooper as a “sieve” because according to estimates from 




advisers in the Third Corps Tactical Zone, “90 per cent of genuine VCI suspects were freed 
within 90 days of capture.”103         
 At the conclusion of his article, Wayne Cooper makes several telling conclusions about 
Phoenix. First, the amount of money invested in the program is impossible to ascertain. 
According to a classified GAO report, the dollars spent totaled “$80 million.” However, Cooper 
figures that the cost was undoubtedly in excess of $100 Million because of factors not figured 
into the GAO amount such as “the costs of the advisory effort alone (training, salaries, vehicles 
and servicing, housing, travel, family allowances).”104 Second, the return on investment is also 
difficult to determine because “the bureaucratic body count-of a US-imposed quota system” does 
not provide a measurable method of cost benefit analysis, and only allows for Saigon and 
Washington officials to “quote statistics on fulfilled quotas; sentencings, and overall 
‘neutralizations’.”105 Lastly, the only real conclusion that can be made about Phoenix was that it 
slowed down “VC political activity.”106 Any other attempts at specific suppositions “would be 
almost impossible to verify.”107          
 Another Phoenix operative, Lt. Commander Michael J. Walsh, provides detailed 
information about the program including some issues discussed by Wayne Cooper. Walsh served 
for twenty-six years in the Navy’s Special Forces, as a member of the United States Navy Sea, 
Air, and Land Teams (SEALs). To begin his service in Phoenix, at 22 years of age, he went 
through training “at Camp Machen in the Cuymaca Mountains east of San Diego,” California.108 
During this six-week course, Walsh was informed that all the senior Vietnamese officers who ran 
the PRUs “were corrupt.”109 His instructor told the trainees that if an order needed approval, 
providing the province chief with something like a “new air conditioner” would be an effective 




 Walsh provides valuable insight related to intelligence data assimilated by Phoenix 
statisticians. He mentions that US Army Captain Geoff Barker, once a PRU adviser, “developed 
a source control chart to help him keep track of the information routinely provided by 
intelligence agencies.”111 This chart permitted any Phoenix adviser “to levy the necessary 
requirements in terms of material support and manpower to either confirm or deny the new 
information coming in from assorted collection methods.”112 This granted “Phoenix advisers” the 
capability, “to plant bad information in the system without tipping our hand to other Vietnamese 
intelligence agencies we were unfriendly with, or suspect of.”113 This practice aided in the 
discovery of agents who worked on other ventures and soon faced dismissal from  Phoenix.114 
 Another important revelation disclosed by Lt. Walsh regarding Phoenix concerns funding 
available to advisers utilized to conduct operations. He points out that the program had a large 
‘war chest’ at its disposal to use for counterintelligence purposes. He states that as an adviser “I 
could draw up to $10, 000 from the program without having to answer serious questions about its 
use.”115 This figure translates into $77, 000 today. After signing for and receiving the 
disbursement, Walsh and his team could proceed into the jungle with their objective to find the 
‘bad guys’ and gather intelligence from those “who could be bought, bribed, controlled, 
intimidated, or all of the above.”116 With 704 Phoenix advisers in place by 1970, and potential 
monetary allocations over $11,000,000 in 2018 dollars it is no wonder that Phoenix was able to 
neutralize thousands of suspects.117 According to estimates, by the middle of 1971, the operation 
to neutralize the VCI was being conducted “at a reported cost of over $1 billion to the US and an 
undisclosed amount to the Saigon government.”118 This brings up several questions that remain 
unanswered: Was the program cost beneficial? Did Phoenix end up costing the lives of more 




provided by those who named names to avoid torture or death or to simply fatten their wallets? 
These issues deserve further study!          
 A report by Colonel William L. Knapp, entitled Phoenix/Phung Hoang and the Future: A 
Critical Analysis of the US/GVN Program to Neutralize the Viet Cong Infrastructure, published 
by the Army War College in 1971, provides further information related to the inner workings of 
Phoenix. Knapp’s then confidential account examined the operation and evaluated its capabilities 
in the performance of the objective to neutralize the VCI and the propensity for future program 
accomplishments. The report’s assessment considered efforts utilized to bring the Malayan 
Emergency, events occurring from 1948-1960 in Malaya, now known as Malaysia, following the 
Federation of Malaya’s creation in 1948, to a conclusion. Engagement in guerrilla warfare was 
undertaken by the Malayan National Liberation Army, a military component of the Malayan 
Communist Party in opposition to the Commonwealth armed forces, backed by Britain. Knapp 
compares the methods used to end the Malayan Emergency, and the tools used by Phoenix to 
undermine the VCI infrastructure.          
 To begin his study, Knapp presents historical background on the Malayan Emergency 
and then focuses on the methods “used to defeat or neutralize the Communist guerrilla 
infrastructure.”119 Prior to the ‘emergency’ Britain acquired an interest in Malaya beginning in 
1786, “and by 1895 had succeeded in establishing on the peninsula an "organized confederacy" 
under the British Residency System.”120 While the British endeavored to solidify their rule, the 
Malayan Communist Party (MCP) formed in 1930, and “by 1939 an extremely capable young 
Vietnamese named Lai Tek had succeeded in organizing a Communist cell system that covered 
Malaya.”121  At the outset of World War II and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor during the 




in February 1942, captured Singapore. After Britain and Russia formed an alliance to battle 
Japan, the Malayan Communist Party reversed its opposition against England and rallied against 
the Japanese imperialists. Before exiting Singapore, “the British were able to train 200 of their 
men to stay behind and train the Communist guerrillas.”122 Thus, the Malayan Peoples' Anti-
Japanese Army (MPAJA) originated. It was primarily a rebel force composed of Chinese 
squatters, “refugees of sorts, who had come to the edge of the jungle, scratched out a piece of 
land and subsisted on it.”123 These ‘squatters’ played an essential role in the ‘emergency’ that 
began in 1948.            
 After Japan surrendered in 1945, the Chinese guerrillas faced a quandary. First, their 
previous involvement with Britain against the Japanese involved a commitment to disband their 
army at the end of the war. However, the guerillas had accumulated many British weapons 
during the war from “depots and armories,” when the Japanese first overran the peninsula.124 
After ceremonially turning in weapons as part of the disbandment procedures advocated by 
Britain, they still possessed “large concealed caches of arms and ammunition.”125 Second, the 
MPAJA had formed an ‘Old Comrades Association’ with “branches in every town and a parallel 
peoples' organization among the "squatters" and villagers.”126 This association did function to 
unite the people socially, but it also operated covertly “to keep the MPAJA intact.”127 This 
dilemma led to the Malayan Emergency when it became obvious by early June 1948, “that a 
Chinese Communist campaign of terror had begun.”128       
 In an effort to deal with this problem, the Federal Legislature passed The Emergency 
Regulations Ordinance in June 1948, which provided “extreme powers to police and other 
government forces and were used throughout the Emergency as required.”129 First, the act 




Vietnam, the process worked in Malaya since “one could not exist within the law and villages 
without a card.”131 Individuals utilized the card to obtain food and other necessities. Second, the 
law allowed police agencies to “arrest and detain without trial,” which was a similar tactic used 
by Phoenix operatives in Vietnam.132 It should also be noted that the MCP and “its front 
organizations were not declared illegal until 23 July 1948.”133 This allowed the “police to keep a 
close watch on the party members and the people with whom the party members came in 
contact,” and immediately led to the arrest of “600 known party members.”134   
 Following this brief historical overview, Knapp proceeds to explain the mechanics 
undertaken by Malayan police forces to deal with the communist insurgency. He points out that 
the “early buildup of a qualified police force under British command, and its retention at village 
level throughout the 'emergency'” accompanied by leadership changes facilitated effectiveness 
and “insured an early and continuous attack on the Malayan infrastructure.”135 Knapp also notes 
that the utilization of Special Branch detectives (supported by military intelligence) at village 
level, provided the essential intelligence to destroy the support organization.”136   
 After comparing the differences and similarities of Phoenix with those of the tactics used 
to end the Malayan emergency, Knapp makes conclusions and recommendations. First, he notes 
that the “Phung Hoang Program has served a useful purpose, is on the right track, but is in need 
of modification.”137 He argues that Phoenix should become ‘absorbed’ by the Vietnamese 
National Police Force.138 According to Knapp, this had been accomplished at the national level, 
but needed undertakings directed at “province and district levels.”139 This absorption entailed 
“control, physical plant, and principle operatives under the National Police.”140 Knapp also 
surmises that by having several contributing agencies involved in the operation the chances of 




way Phung Hoang could be significantly effective would be “if pacification, in its broadest 
sense, succeeds.”142 He concludes that the operation would not be ultimately successful “ unless 
the. GVN can lift the yoke of terror from the villagers and, at the same time, show the villagers 
that it is a government capable of not only protecting them but serving their interests as well.”143 
  It must also be mentioned that the Phoenix Program was connected to a harrowing event 
that occurred in South Vietnam on March 16, 1968. On that day, two squadrons of American 
soldiers, with one under the command of Lieutenant William Calley, “accompanied by US Army 
Intelligence officers,” moved into the small village of My Lai, located in Quang Nai province 
and over an eight hour period proceeded to murder “504 men, women and children.”144 This 
incredible act of terror was not reported in the press until over a year later, when New York 
Times correspondent Seymour Hersh broke the story in November 1969. After the narrative was 
reported, Army Chief of Staff William Westmoreland assigned General William Peers, a former 
CIA chief of training in Taiwan, onetime supervisor for the OSS during World War II, and 
special assistant over counterinsurgency and special activities for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to 
investigate. Peers submitted his report in March 1970, “which was not made available to the 
public until 1974 and which carefully avoided implicating the CIA.”145     
 The Peers report failed to point a finger at the Agency’s participation at My Lai for the 
following reasons. First, the obvious connection that Peers had with CIA and its forerunner 
demonstrates a conflict of interest and bias in favor of his previous employer. This is reminiscent 
of the appointment of former CIA director Allen Dulles to the Warren Commission, investigating 
President John F. Kennedy’s assassination. Dulles was fired by Kennedy over the Bay of Pigs, 
and then asked by new President Lyndon Johnson to investigate his former Agency’s possible 




pacification in South Vietnam, he was a confidant of Evan Parker, “the CIA officer who headed 
ICEX,” which “oversaw Phoenix.”147 Thus, it comes as no surprise that the Peers inquiry found 
no evidence of CIA involvement at My Lai and blamed it on the American forces and their 
officers.             
 Not only did it take some time for information to be publicized about the massacre at My 
Lai, but a cover-up of the tragedy began almost immediately after the slaughter took place. A 
Time magazine poll of 1,608 Americans taken in early 1970, indicated that 65 percent of those 
surveyed merely shrugged the carnage off, concluding that “incidents such as this are bound to 
happen in a war.”148 The cover-up was essentially intended “to disguise the fact that My Lai was 
a part of the CIA killing program called Operation Phoenix.”149 Douglas Valentine notes that the 
killings at My Lai were “a result of Phoenix,” because the operation “provided an outlet for the 
repressed fears and anger of the psyched up men of Task Force Barker.”150 Based on the 
objective to neutralize the VCI, targets became young children, the elderly, men and women. 
Anyone could possess a gun, a knife or a grenade. The Phoenix directive and the emphasis 
placed on soldiers to follow orders, engrained in the minds of American soldiers, “made it as 
easy to shoot a Vietnamese child as it was to shoot a sparrow in a tree.”151     
 The My Lai massacre was formulated by two principals, Paul Ramsdell, the CIA head 
over Phoenix in the Quang Ngai Province, and Colonel Ton That Khien, the province chief.152 At 
the time of the massacre, the CIA had one of its largest contingents in this area.153 As province 
director Ramsdell was in charge of putting together the ‘blacklists’ of NLF suspects. This 
information was then provided to the US Army squadrons who killed the villagers. Ramsdell 
expressed his sentiments regarding the inhabitants of the Vietnamese hamlet to Task Force 




couldn’t survive in that area unless they were sympathizers.”154 Ta Linh Vien, a member of the 
covertly CIA funded Census Grievance Committee, after viewing intelligence estimates 
concluded that My Lai “was under VC control.”155 He also contended that all of the hamlet’s 
residents including women, the elderly, and even children “have some weapon at home.”156 
 Colonel Khien, the other My Lai collaborator, provided input to Ramsdell about the Viet 
Cong. He hated the NLF for inflicting damage on his family during the Tet offensive which 
began in January 1968. Khien also detested the group because it “had seriously disrupted his 
business enterprises.”157 He was regarded as “being one of South Vietnam’s most corrupt 
chieftains,” making money in ventures “from payroll fraud to prostitution.”158 He also derived a 
substantial amount of revenue “from heroin sales to US soldiers.”159 In response to the attack at 
My Lai, he stated “that he had been notified of the killings within a week but at first had assumed 
that they had been the result of an artillery barrage and therefore a sad but unavoidable act of 
war.”160            
 Further implications linking Phoenix and the massacre comes from Sergeant David 
Mitchell, a Task Force Barker soldier, who was tried for the murder of “dozens of civilians at 
My Lai.”161 At his trial, Mitchell’s attorney’s cited “Phoenix as the CIA’s ‘systematic program of 
assassination,’” and identified CIA officer Evan Parker as the one “who ‘signed certain 
documents, certain blacklists,’ of Vietnamese to be assassinated in My Lai.”162 Of course, Parker 
denied that in an interview with Douglas Valentine, and he was never subpoenaed by the 
court.163 The blacklist was also never obtained, and the CIA’s lawyer, John Greaney also denied 
agency involvement. When he was questioned about any CIA operations ever being conducting 
at My Lai, he merely stated, “I don’t know.”164 Denials like these have been commonplace since 




director of the CIA from 1952 to 1964. Sergeant Mitchell, by the way, was cleared of any wrong 
doing at My Lai.             
 Eventually, more information was disclosed about the massacre. Evidence revealed that 
as many as fifty US officers including generals were aware of the slaughter, “either through 
firsthand observation or eyewitness reports.”165 Also, the massive cover-up included all of these 
military officials, either through suppression of the truth or refusal “to act upon the information 
they received.”166 Eighteen officers were finally indicted on criminal charges but none of them 
were found guilty except Lieutenant Calley who was convicted of murdering “twenty-two 
civilians” out of the 504 slayed villagers who called My Lai their home.167 During the trial, 
testifying in his own defense, he claimed that his superior, Captain Ernest Medina who gave the 
orders to kill the Vietnamese, assured him that “all civilians would be away” and that “anyone 
left would be considered enemies.”168 He also stated that Medina used the word “’neutralize’ at 
least four times in describing his understanding of the March 16 operation.”169 Calley was given 
a life term, but President Richard Nixon commuted his sentence so he only served three and a 
half years under house arrest.170         
 Even though the senseless killings committed by the troops of Task Force Barker at My 
Lai stands out as one of the most notorious and tragic war crimes in US history, following the 
incident “accounts of smaller-scale acts of mutilation, torture, rape and murder increasingly 
began to surface.171 After finding out about these occurrences, many people drew a conclusion 
“that My Lai was not an isolated event, but an extreme yet logical outgrowth of a military 
strategy that sent young men on ‘search and destroy’ missions into rural villages under extreme 
pressure to locate” enemies that were difficult to differentiate “from civilians, and measured the 




realities rang true. Operatives went into the villages, seeking the suspected Vietcong, brought 
them back to the PIC, interrogated and tortured them. and then if they would not turn, eradicated 
them. The scorecard, a feature broadcast on the nightly evening news that all Americans could 
watch showed how well the game of war was being played in Vietnam by the US military and 
the CIA who utilized various offensive strategies with an ultimate goal to increase the body 
count.             
 Analysis of an tri law proceedings, referenced in chapter three, also reflects on the 
efficacy of Phoenix operations. Guenter Lewy, Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the 
University of Massachusetts Amherst conducted an extensive review of these reports published 
his 1978 book America in Vietnam. One problem with an tri procedures “was the backlog in 
processing VCI suspects” which became “so heavy that suspects in most cases had to wait six 
months or more before being released.”173 Even though after several months attempts were made 
to control the backlog by transferring suspects to other jurisdictions “difficulties of coping with 
the constant influx of VCI suspects continued.”174 As a result, “innocent persons were often held 
for an extended time without a hearing,” due to “faulty intelligence, gathered by unqualified 
personnel,” and “officials” who used the program against personal enemies of to exhort 
bribes.”175 Evidence to support this claim comes from an Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (OASD) report dated September/October 1970 which states that “4,181 persons of the 
6,111captured during the preceding seven months [68 percent] were still awaiting disposition of 
their cases.”176 Even though rules were put in place in June 1971, mandating the maximum 
processing time for an tri cases at 46 months, “implementation of this provision proved 
difficult.”177            




Phoenix. He notes that not only were innocent civilians with no connection to subversive 
activities being detained, but also that “dangerous members of the VCI often were quickly set 
free.”178 To substantiate this claim he provides a September 1969 report from Quang Ngai 
province which indicates “that only about one-third of VCI apprehended are actually convicted 
and sentenced,” with “reason to believe that some VCI escape conviction by paying off some 
official.”179 Additional documentation demonstrates “that until mid-1969 75-90 percent of all 
captured VCI reported neutralized were released within six months.”180 This led to a change in 
the definition of the term which from January 1970 on counted “as neutralized only those 
sentenced to a meaningful term of detention.”181 Of course then the question arises as to what is 
meaningful. And regarding the time spent in confinement, Lewy also notes that “efforts at 
rehabilitation were poor and many of those freed presumably rejoined the VCI.182    
  Jeff Stein, a Phoenix advisor who helped direct intelligence operations from the coastal 
city of Da Nang, and supervised agents in the “Quang Nam and southern Thua Thien provinces” 
for one year, “from November 1968 to November 1969” provides perspective on Phoenix.183 On 
one occasion in 1969, he received evidence that indicated one of his subordinates was a counter 
spy. In response to these allegations, Stein gave his operative a polygraph examination, which 
revealed “attempts at deception--lying.”184 Stein pondered what do in this situation since “it was 
nearly impossible to establish the truth of these matters in Viet Nam, where a kind of frontier 
justice prevailed.”185 Should he trust the polygraph results and neutralize the agent, or give him 
up to South Vietnamese authorities who would probably do the same thing? While in Vietnam, 
Stein had become familiar with Vietnamese history and culture and “learned that the political 
loyalties of most Viets were splintered along family, clan, religious, and multiple ideological 




Viet, with certainty, as ‘procommunist,’ pro-Saigon,’ or ‘pro-US,’” even with the aid of a lie 
detector.187 However, this inability to separate the communists from the non-communists did not 
deter the “odious methods” used by Phoenix.188 Fortunately, in this case Stein did not end up 
eliminating his aide because additional questioning “revealed that…[his] agent had not 
"bounced" the polygraph because he was a communist, but because he was a member of a right-
wing political movement [Vietnam Quoc Dan Dang (VNQDD)] conspiring against the Saigon 
government!”189           
 In reflecting on this experience with Phoenix, and the information he had at his disposal, 
Stein began to have a greater understanding of what was really going on in Vietnam. He directly 
refutes those who argued that America could win the war through a combination of military 
might and counter insurgency tactics. After reading countless numbers of pages of intelligence 
reports on suspected agents who were members of VNQDD, along with information from the 
CIA, Navy, Air Force [and] Vietnamese newspapers, Stein concluded that he and his operatives 
were “being used by this political party to wipe out their opponents on the left.”190 Those 
individuals who were listed as “Communists were left wing Buddhists and that information was 
going to the Phoenix program. We were being used to assassinate their political rivals.”  
 Stein also disclosed other pertinent information related to Phoenix operations. Regarding 
the PRUs, he indicates that the CIA would order the reconnaissance “teams to go out and take 
care of a particular target…either capture or assassination, or kidnapping.”191 According to Stein, 
Phoenix agents enjoyed the thrill of going into a South Vietnamese village under cover of 
darkness and grabbing a VC suspect, and then putting him into a “garbage collection type” bin 
which a helicopter would then pick up and take to a PIC.192 This procedure meant that the 




turn someone like that back into the countryside it would just be multiplying NLF followers.”193 
 Stein also points out that even though “some Phoenix directors carefully built solid bases 
of intelligence” by skillfully using “defector interrogations and double agents, others dispatched 
their hunter-killer PRU teams as soon as the suspects were fingered and assassinated them on the 
spot.”194 He describes the operation as a “logical compromise between the counterinsurgency 
emphasis” transpiring during JFKs administration “and Lyndon Johnson’s massive escalation, 
between the CIA and the Pentagon, between ‘hearts and minds’ and ‘search and destroy.’”195 He 
argues that the Phoenix was a closely “held secret inside the CIA, except to Green Berets who 
were borrowed for the program.”196 Efforts undertaken in the PICS as well as in the jungles, 
villages and hamlets of Vietnam were considered by many as “all part of the war.”197 In his role 
as an advisor, traveling throughout the provinces Stein observed a particular “sign in the offices 
of many Phoenix operatives” which read, “When you got ’em by the balls their hearts and minds 
will follow.198            
 In 1992, Jeff Stein published a book entitled A Murder in Vietnam, which focuses on the 
case of eight Green Beret officers brought to trial for conspiring to kill a suspected Vietnamese 
double agent Chuyen Thai Khac. One of the accused Green Berets, Capt. Leland Brumley, 
became especially vehement towards the CIA during the trial because their witnesses attempted 
to portray him and his fellow officers “as barroom thugs” while as part of Phoenix, Agency 
operatives “were the very people who were engaging in an indiscriminate, murderous campaign 
against mostly civilian targets.”199 Brumley and the other accused conspirators accumulated 
several classified documents sent to them by acquaintances. Based on their own knowledge as 
well as the documentation from friends they noted several important issues about the Agency and 




services had created and maintained an active list of Viet Cong cadre marked for 
assassination.”200 Second, evidence was discovered which indicated Phoenix was given a target 
number of neutralizations in 1969 of “eighteen hundred civilian Viet Cong cadre a month.”201 
Third, contrary to “US claims that Phoenix was nothing more than an aggressive police 
program,” roughly “one-third of the Viet Cong targeted for arrest had been summarily killed.”202 
Fourth, the ‘security committees’ in the PICs set up to judge the Viet Cong detainees were 
outside the judicial controls ballyhooed by US officials.”203 Fifth, the accused officers found that 
“the most common recruits for the Phoenix program” were Navy SEALS and members of their 
own ranks, the US Army Special Forces, “under direct CIA supervision.”204   
 Robert Komer one of the founders of Phoenix and CORDS, provides further insight into 
Phoenix in a paper entitled Organization and Management of the New Model Pacification 
Program 1966-1969, which evolved from a seminar held by the RAND Corporation in 
November 1969. The publication includes a question and answer session with Komer, his 
executive officer at CORDS, Robert M. Montague, and Charles H. McDonald, Chief of the 
Current History Branch, Office of the Chief of Military History (OCMH). An entire chapter of 
the publication is devoted to a discussion of Phoenix and mentions at the outset that it was “a sad 
commentary” that efforts on the part of the US and the GVN to organize an effective counter 
insurgency attack on the VCI did not take place until “mid 1967” and that “failure was not 
because we didn’t recognize the problem” since studies had been undertaken a decade before 
“that correctly identified the key VCI role.”205 The underlying issue was that according to 
Komer, it wasn’t dealt with “as an operational and management problem—it was everybody’s 
business and nobody’s.”206 Focusing on this concept in the middle of 1966, consisted of 




and local forces but also rooting out the clandestine political and terror apparatus.”207     
 Komer goes on to make observations about Phoenix, its tactics and inefficacies. He 
blames the GVN for being not only too slow to get the operation running but also for having 
ineffective institutions including the police, the courts, and prisons which “had largely to be 
rebuilt from scratch.”208 Komer also contends that Phoenix was not a counter terror program, as 
its critics claimed. He also expresses doubt that the program was being “used for other political 
purposes than rooting out the VCI,” and blames the GVN for Phoenix’s “sloppy and feeble” 
implementation, “despite US advisory help.”209 He questions the efficiency of the GVN based on 
the thousands of VCI that were arrested and then let go, wondering whether those released might 
have “bribed their way out.”210 Komer then concludes that even if the numbers showing “12,000 
VCI neutralized in 1968 and 19,500 in 1969” are incorrect “and included mostly low level VCI” 
Phoenix “was still putting a serious dent in the VCI cadre structure” and just the idea that they 
know the GVN is after them “in a big way probably has a destabilizing and deterrent impact on” 
their “ability to do their job.”211         
 In 2009, the RAND Corporation published another report on Phoenix, which took a 
middle ground position on the operation. The study, sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, and conducted by William Rosenau, former counterterrorism adviser at the State 
Department, and Austin Long, former assistant professor at Columbia University’s School of 
International and Public Affairs, concluded that “the historical record shows that Phoenix was 
neither wildly successful nor a massive assassination program.”212 It did make “a contribution to 
the broader U.S. pacification campaign waged in the Vietnamese countryside, but its success 
came at a political cost to the United States.”213 This cost reflected in media reports described the 




U.S. power and global ambitions.”214 Unanswered questions that arise from the RAND study are: 
How did Rosenau and Long define success, and what body count numbers did they consider as a 
threshold for ‘massive’?        
 Another criticism that can be leveled against the RAND study concerns cost estimates of 
Phoenix. The report refers to the program as ‘low cost’ or ‘minimal’ on several pages.215 
However, the authors only present this conclusion based on cost estimates of the program 
between 1968 and 1972 at $4 million. However, this figure, as the study indicates does not 
consider monetary “support to operational units, such as the PRUs.”216 These units numbered as 
many as 5000 and operated in all South Vietnamese provinces.”217 Douglas Valentine provides 
the cost of these units from the 1970 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings as 
$5,000,000 in 1969, and “an increased cost of more than six million dollars” by 1970.218 Thus, 
RAND presents a low cost perspective on Phoenix that does not hold up when PRU costs are 
considered. Ironically, RAND mentions that Phoenix generated a political cost levied against the 
United States, since many media sources portrayed it as an assassination program.   
 John Ranelagh, a British historian, studied the Central Intelligence Agency and reported 
his findings in The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA. He carefully examined the Church 
Committee report, interviewed several Agency officials, and utilized the Freedom of Information 
Act to obtain many relevant documents. After researching Phoenix, Ranelagh describes the 
operation as “a well-conceived program badly executed.”219 He mentions that of the many 
organizations comprising the Vietcong infrastructure one of the most formidable was the Ban-an-
ninh, who “engaged in assassinations, terror, and kidnappings as well as running a massive 
espionage operation against the South Vietnamese armed forces and government.”220 This group 




history of warfare.”221 Under directions from Hanoi, the Ban-an-ninh successfully penetrated 
“the heart of the military and political establishment in Saigon and remains arguably the most 
effective intelligence apparatus of all time.”222 Some members of this terrorist infrastructure 
defected and received amnesty to participate in Phoenix.223 However, even though Phoenix 
obtained intelligence from several of these defectors, the operation in turn had many of its own 
team members and families “abducted, tortured, and murdered by the equally ruthless Ban-an-
ninh” who chose to stay in the VC ranks.224         
 Ranelagh also discovered that other subgroups besides the Ban-an-ninh were crucial to 
the effectiveness of the PRUs, a mainstay of Phoenix operations. Groups including the Secret 
Police, the Medical Service, and the Military Proselytizing Unit, all assisted in strengthening the 
power of the Vietcong infrastructure. While the MACV focused on the PRUs, its officers and 
Phoenix advisers realized that fighting against these organizations was also vitally important to 
counterinsurgency efforts.225 A central problem that developed, however, was that because there 
was such a demand for quantification and quotas, “soon the Phoenix groups were infiltrated by 
the very people they were trying to defeat and were turned by them against the South Vietnamese 
government.”226 As one MACV intelligence officer and overseer put it “Quite often I found the 
reports I was submitting being used for one person located in one spot at one time being either 
assassinated on the spot or brought in for interrogation and tortured to death without any second 
opinion whatsoever.”227 Additionally, compounding factors involving interrogation procedures 
undertaken at the overcrowded PICs along with “the process of even considering legal recourse, 
was just too overpowering, considering the mania of the body count and the quotas assigned for 
VCI and neutralization.”228 Thus, it became “a matter of expediency just to eliminate a person in 




Adams, who had reported in a 1975 Harper’s Magazine article that US military intelligence  
underestimated the numbers of VC and PAVN soldiers, phrased it Phoenix “assassinated a lot of 
the wrong damn people.”230          
 Even though, Ranelagh stresses that CIA officers were an integral part of Phoenix 
operations, he notes they were primarily involved with planning and analyzing data reported by 
teams in the field.231 He notes that the CIA financed the PICs, regional and provincial officers 
supervised what went on there, “and every person who ran Phoenix from Saigon was assigned to 
the program from the Agency.”232 He places the blame for the atrocities committed by Phoenix 
on the “South Vietnamese government and armed forces” who were willing to participate in “all 
the dirty work themselves.”233 But Ranelagh does emphasize that the CIA “clearly condoned 
what was happening” describing Agency agents and officers as “investment bankers physically 
removed from the operations they have funded—making things possible but not dirtying their 
hands.”234            
 Primary documents provide information on the efficacy of Phoenix and demonstrate 
concern on the part of the executive branch regarding results and future expectations of the 
operation. National Security Study Memorandum 1, distributed on January 21, 1969 to the 
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence and signed 
by National Security Advisor Henry A. Kissinger on behalf of President Richard M. Nixon, asks 
a series of questions about efforts being undertaken in Vietnam. Although not mentioning 
Phoenix by name, several questions clearly indicate that the program was being referenced. For 
example, one question asks, “What number or verified numbers of the Communist political 
apparatus (i.e., People’s Revolutionary Party members, the hard-core “infrastructure”) have been 




higher than village level?”236 While a third query considers “What proportion do these represent 
of total PRP membership, and how much—and how long—had the apparatus been disrupted?”237 
A two-part interrogatory is listed, wondering “What are the reasons for believing that current and 
future efforts at “rooting out” hard-core infrastructure will be—or will not be—more successful 
than past efforts? For example, for believing that collaboration among the numerous Vietnamese 
intelligence agencies will be markedly more thorough than in the past?”238 Finally, Kissinger 
asks “What are the side-effects, e.g., on Vietnamese opinion, of anti-infrastructure campaigns 
such as the current “accelerated effort,” along with their lasting effect on hardcore apparatus?” 
Answers to all these questions were to be forwarded to the President by February 10, 1969.”239  
 Another document, a 1969 end of year report lists accomplishments of the operation, 
noting, “19,534 VCI were reported as neutralized during the period 1 January through 31 
December 1969.”240 The report also mentions that efforts in 1969 produced more neutralizations 
than the previous year, which numbered 15,776.241 Priority targets are categorized as “security 
personnel, finance and economy, revolutionary committee personnel, and current affairs 
committee personnel.”242 Numbers of those neutralized in each category are listed, and the report 
notes that the total priority VCI targets neutralized were 11,675, about 60% of the 19,534 
total.”243 Another report documenting results obtained in 1971, showed “17,690 neutralized 
compared with the calendar year goal of 15,600.”244      
 Even though the Phoenix program’s support by the US government supposedly ended in 
1972, it continued for two more years under a different name. F-6 was chosen as the code 
designation for a continued defensive effort “to bolster Phung Hoang after the Easter Offensive,” 
a military campaign on the part of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) that took place 




and strived “to increase pressure on the VCI by allowing province chiefs to move against 
suspected cadre on the strength of a single report rather than the usual three.”246 In 1973, after 




            Conclusion          
                           
                                           Phoenix Rises from the Ashes  
                                                                             
 The bird swooped without flutter or frown and began to kill, pillage, and burn, but before it was done, 
 before the fight was won, its time had come to return.                         
 -Final Phung Hoang Adviser, Vihn Long Province, IV Corps      
  
 Even though Phoenix finally terminated operations in Vietnam, the tactics utilized within 
the operation continued to be a mainstay of counterinsurgency efforts across the globe. In the 
1970s, Operation Condor, an “intelligence and operations system…through which the South 
American military regimes coordinated intelligence information and seized, tortured, and 
executed political opponents in combined cross-border operations” encompassing the nations of 
“Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, and Brazil, Ecuador and Peru” and backed by the 
CIA, was implemented.1 The parallels between Condor, Phoenix and the US Army’s Project X, a 
counterintelligence effort first launched in 1965-1966, are numerous.2 As journalist Richard Gott 
observed in an article published in the Guardian in 1976, "The assassinations of leading Latin 
American officers and politicians in the last three years have become so numerous that there is a 
growing feeling amongst observers of the continent's politics that something akin to Operation 
Phoenix is now underway.”3 Condor was another attempt on the part of the United States to fight 
communism, this time in Latin America. It incorporated “counterguerrilla forces made up of 
military officers and paramilitary irregulars” with “methods of terror” including “assassination 
and abduction…ambushing, raiding, sabotaging” and other “diverse forms of coercion and 
violence.”4           
 A few years later, when Ronald Reagan became president in 1981, his administration 
voiced more concern about the communist presence in Central America. The nation of El 




Reagan to be supported by the Soviet Union. Through an increase in military support for the 
Latin American country, Phoenix rose from the ashes of its pyre to assist the United States once 
again in dealing with adversaries. Trusting in the expertise of the personnel who ran the 
operation in Vietnam, “the US sent the exact same people involved in the Phoenix program to 
advise El Salvador on how to wage war on its own peasants.”5 Two of these individuals included 
CIA officers, Donald Gregg and Rudy Enders.6      
 Yet another nation that experienced the legacy of Phoenix was Honduras. After the 1981 
Salvadoran Civil War, Honduras was “transformed into a staging ground for covert operations.”7 
The CIA conducted interrogation training sessions for Honduran soldiers in their home country 
and in the Unites States as well. One recruit, Sergeant Florencio Caballero was sent “to Texas 
with 24 others for six months between 1979 and 1980.8 One of his instructors was an Agency 
chief known only as ‘Mr. Bill’ “who had served in Vietnam.”9 After completing their instruction, 
Caballero and the other soldiers joined Battalion 316, a counter intelligence group, and 
proceeded to carry “out a campaign of torture, extrajudicial killing, and state-sponsored terror 
against Honduran civilians.”10 These appropriately named ‘death squads’ travelled “in unmarked 
cars and” would “whisk people away for violent interrogations” then conduct acts of torture on 
“live prisoners.”11 The unit was responsible for the disappearance of at least “184 people whose 
bodies were never found, not to mention the many who were tortured and survived.”12 One of the 
survivors, Ines Murillo, a Marxist, was transported to a “secret army safe house” and tortured for 
“eighty days.”13 Some of the methods inflicted upon her included subjection “to electrical shocks 
for thirty five days” and being served “raw dead birds and rats for dinner.”14   
 Nicaragua was another nation in Central America that utilized Phoenix strategies and 




in that country, headed by Daniel Ortega. He was convinced that this radical group, backed by 
Cuba and the Soviets, “harbored ideologically motivated ambitions beyond their own 
frontiers.”15 To deal with this communist supported organization, “an anti-Sandinista army 
known as the ‘contras’” came into existence.16 William Casey, the CIA’s director under Reagan, 
produced an assassination manual for the Contras entitled Psychological Operations in Guerrilla 
Warfare which “reads like an update of the Phoenix Program.”17 The handbook advocates 
violence “to neutralize carefully selected and planned targets such as court judges, police and 
state security officials.”18 Felix Rodriguez, a Cuban exile, who not only helped with the Bay of 
Pigs invasion and the killing of Che Guevara, but also served as, “a Provincial Reconnaissance 
Units (PRU) adviser in the Phoenix program,” was utilized for support with counter 
insurgency.19  His assistance in training the contras accompanied by their engagement “in terror 
and assassination that often targeted Nicaraguan health workers and teachers or any government 
member they could get their hands on,” generated efforts effective in the elimination of “the 
Sandinista ‘Infrastructure.’”20          
 Following efforts in these South American countries, Phoenix continued to rise. This 
time, the destinations were Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan. In Iraq, techniques and personnel 
utilized in El Salvador were applied to that middle-eastern nation. The objective there was to 
kidnap and torture individuals who had suspected involvement with the Sunni insurgency.21 
Death squads organized and trained in Syria, attempted “to overthrow the government in a 
manner similar to the way they used the contras in Nicaragua.”22 These squadrons would target 
the nation’s infrastructure, endeavoring “to destroy food production, hospitals schools, water, 
electricity and power, even cultural sites,” and in the process, “kill as many people as 




and received intelligence assistance from the opium drug lord Gul Agha Sherzai. With his tips, 
“the CIA methodically tortured and killed Afghanistan’s most revered leaders in a series of 
Phoenix-style raids that radicalized the Afghan people.”24 This set the stage for the CIA to 
initiate “war as a pretext for a prolonged occupation and colonization of” that country.25  
 The official policy of the United States government on torture changes periodically and is 
delineated in numerous documents. In 2001, George W. Bush, as part of his War on Terror, 
following the attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, authorized “harsh 
interrogation techniques,” reminiscent of Phoenix.26 Nine days after the attacks, the president 
stated before a Joint Session of Congress that evidence indicated that “loosely affiliated terrorist 
organizations known as al-Qaida.” were responsible for the New York City strikes.27 Bush also 
argued that the goal and policy of the United States and its allies would be to “oversee and 
coordinate a comprehensive national strategy to safeguard our country against terrorism and 
respond to any attacks that may come.”28 He also made very clear that the war on terror would be 
unceasing “until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”29 
Bush also issued a warning to other nations that aligned themselves with terrorists and warned, 
“Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.”30 Through Bush’s direction and the 
support of the public, torture became more important as a tool to prevent future terrorist 
occurrences both at home and abroad.        
 As part of the Patriot Act, passed by Congress on October 26, 2001, the US military and 
the CIA, to safeguard national security, utilized detainment of suspected terrorists at 
Guantanamo Bay in Cuba and enhanced interrogation methods such as “forced nudity, 
waterboarding, sleep deprivation and stress positions.”31 Along with these means, eight other 




responses from suspects.32 After the invasion of Iraq in 2003, “torture techniques refined by the 
Central Intelligence Agency over the last half century,” were administered, at Abu Ghraib prison 
located 32 kilometers west of Baghdad. 33 These psychosomatic methods generate “deep 
psychological damage to both victims and their interrogators, who can become capable of 
unspeakable physical cruelties.”34 As mentioned previously, these practices of torture “were 
codified in 1963 in a secret manual known as "KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation,” and 
implemented in Phoenix at its inception in 1967.35 George W. Bush allowed Phoenix’s legacy to 
rise to an even higher level by using a “presidential veto to defend certain exemptions from CIA 
interrogation” while maintaining that his administration supported “a narrow interpretation of 
torture that permits techniques as extreme as waterboarding on the grounds that they are not 
severe enough to constitute torture.”36 In essence, his “entire war on terror apparatus mimics the 
Phoenix Program and fusion centers have already been set up to share intelligence on the 
American population itself.”37         
 Another important development related to Phoenix set up during the Bush administration 
involved what are known as black sites (fig. 5.1). Organized after the 9/11 attacks, these  
“prisons outside the United States” were “part of a secret CIA program” that made use of 
Phoenix torture techniques during interrogation of suspected terrorists.38 The Province 
Interrogation Centers, essential to the programs functioning were “the exact forerunners of these 
black sites.”39 George W. Bush did whatever he could “to keep secret the treatment of the 
hundred or so “high-value detainees” whom the C.I.A. has confined, at one point or another, 
since September 11th.”40 An article in The Washington Post from 2005 reported that based on 
information obtained from former and current intelligence officials and diplomats, these centers 




Europe, as well as a small center at the Guantanamo Bay prison in Cuba.”41 The black sites, 
according to the US government utilize “alternative interrogation methods” that must be kept 
secret because their disclosure would “reasonably be expected to cause extremely grave 
damage,” and threaten America’s national security.42      
 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), formed in 1863, investigated the  
allegations of torture undertaken at these hidden locations. For four years the organization waited 
on the CIA and the US government, to permit interviews with fourteen detainees who had been 
held at the sites and then finally transferred to Guantanamo. However, the Red Cross account 
was initially “kept from the public” and CIA officials failed to “even acknowledge the existence 
of the report.”43 Finally in February 2007, the ICRC distributed its findings based on private 
interviews held between October 6-11, and December 4-14, 2006. While held at undisclosed 
locations, all of the detainees were subjected to “a harsh regimen employing a combination of 
physical and psychological ill-treatment with the aim of obtaining compliance and extracting 
information.”44 They were all placed in “continuous solitary confinement” and were not allowed 
to speak to anyone but their interrogators for the entire time they were confined, which ranged 
from “some days to several months.”45 The ICRC defined the term ill-treatment that the 
prisoners were subjected to as “torture and/or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.”46 The 
methods of torture, reminiscent of Phoenix, included: suffocation by water, prolonged stress 
standing, beatings by use of a collar, beating and kicking, confinement in a box, prolonged 
nudity, sleep deprivation and the use of loud music, exposure to cold temperature/cold water, 
prolonged use of handcuffs and shackles, threats, forced shaving, and deprivation/restricted 
provision of solid food.47         




the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence was issued to the public which 
showed striking similarities between Phoenix and the black sites. Like the operation in Vietnam, 
interrogators at these covert locations subjected prisoners to “enhanced interrogation techniques 
and afterwards, multiple CIA detainees fabricated information, resulting in faulty intelligence.”48 
The report notes that 26 of 119 individuals imprisoned “were wrongfully held” in confinement 
“because of mistaken identity” and failed to “meet the standard for detention” laid out by George 
W. Bush in a secret “September 2001 Memorandum of Notification (MON).”49 Of the 119, “at 
least 39 were subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques” and of those 7 
“produced no intelligence” at all.50 In the tradition of Phoenix, the study also found that 
combinations of coercive methods of torture were preferred “with significant repetition for days 
or weeks at a time.”51 At first, the Agency reported that interrogators used “an open, 
nonthreatening approach,” and began sessions with the “least coercive technique possible and 
escalated to more coercive techniques only as necessary.”52 However, the committee determined 
that “records do not support” these “CIA representations.”53     
 It must be mentioned that methods listed in the previously referenced KUBARK 
guidebook utilized by interrogators at the black sites which continue to be used today, 
demonstrate “the pervasive influence of the agency’s torture paradigm.”54 The same types of 
interrogation described in the manual used by Phoenix operators in Vietnam, were also used in 
Central America during the 1980s, “and Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001.”55 KUBARK 
established guidelines for assisting interrogators during sessions with “resistant forces.”56 
Chapters are devoted to both coercive and non-coercive methods, although discussion of the 
former is “not [to] be misconstrued as constituting authorization for the use of coercion at field 




poor interrogators.”58 A comparison between the techniques outlined in KUBARK and other 
agency manuals like the “1983 Honduras training handbook, and United States Army Lieutenant 
“General Ricardo Sanchez’s 2003 orders for interrogation in Iraq” shows striking similarities.59 
In fact, the three guidebooks “are almost identical in both conceptual design and specific 
techniques.”60           
 The Vietnam War contributed to growing resentment on the part of many CIA and 
military intelligence operatives who were members of the Phoenix program. They perceived 
America’s defeat in Vietnam “as a betrayal on the home front, a loss of will by domestic political 
enemies, not a military failure against a nationalist revolution fought as a guerilla war.”61 
Through the assassination of Viet Cong partisans, Phoenix evolved into a “blueprint for the 
current black op targeting thousands of” American citizens through the utilization of “state of the 
art microwave (MW) and radio frequency radiation (RFR) weapons.”62 The concept of silencing 
domestic protesters and eliminating citizen “opposition stems from the perception of dissent 
against the war as treason.”63 Counter insurgency techniques, torture and assorted methods of 
killing the enemy, promulgated in “the Phoenix program continues on American soil, so that the 
perceived betrayal of the military in Vietnam will not be repeated.”64      
  Another domestic counterinsurgency operation bearing a close resemblance to the 
Phoenix program was Operation Hammer, a Los Angeles Police Department enterprise created 
by LAPD Chief Daryl Gates in 1987. To diminish gang violence in LA, Hammer utilized 
“hundreds of commando-style raids,” redolent of Phoenix, ‘on gang houses.’”65 As a result, 
“more than 50,000 suspected gang members were swept up for interrogation based on factors 
such as style of dress and whether the suspect was a young black male on the street past 




names was kept on file, evocative of how Phoenix recorded suspected VC.67 In one raid on 
August 1, 1988, Hammer police officers entered two apartment complexes in southwest LA and  
“smashed furniture, punched holes in walls, destroyed family photos, ripped down cabinet doors, 
slashed sofas, shattered mirrors, hammered toilets to porcelain shards, doused clothing with 
bleach and emptied refrigerators.”68 Not content with just property damage, which left “10 adults 
and 12 minors” homeless, the assailants gathered up the apartment dwellers, humiliated and beat 
many of them, “but none was charged with a crime.”69       
 So, what does the future hold for Phoenix? Will more individuals and nations face its ire? 
Time will tell, and if the campaigns of the US government towards its enemies after Vietnam are 
any indication, its continued use appears imminent. Terrorism continues to be of great concern to 
leaders throughout the world, and techniques of counterinsurgency employed by Phoenix, seem 
to be the norm as a mainstay of US military and intelligence agency efforts to fight it. If terrorists 
and rogue regimes continue to wage war against America and its allies, Phoenix “will doubtless 
continue to be reborn again and again,” rising from the ashes to help bring down and defeat the 
enemy.70             
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          Figure 3.1 Corps & Provinces of South Vietnam   





                                                                                                                                                                                           
             
             
    Figure 3.2  Province Interrogation Center    
             
             




                                                                                                                                                                                           
             
             
           
 
             
             
             
             Figure 1.3  Kien Hoa Province PRU Team-1967   
             




                                                                                                                                                                                           
  






                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
             




                                                                                                                                                                                           
             
             
    
 
     
                                           Figure 4.2 Phoenix Neutralizations 1968-1972    
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